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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND TAX 
NEUTRALITY: TAXING THE INVESTMENT 
COMPONENT OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
Eric D. Chason* 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate executives and investment fund managers are not only 
paid more than the rest of us, but they are paid differently as well. Yes, 
they get semi-monthly paychecks and 401(k) matches. But the titans of 
American capitalism receive the bulk of their oft-criticized 
compensation through stock options and plans of deferred 
compensation.' The size of executive pay packages has attracted steady 
and sustained attention from Congress and scholars for years, focused 
ever more sharply by the financial crisis of 2008-2009.2 Tax 
scholarship in particular has often focused on whether Congress could 
and should control the size of executive pay through the Internal 
Revenue Code.3 Until recently, traditional tax policy concerns, like the 
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law. I would like to thank Eric Kades, John Lee, Kirk Stark, David Weisbach, George Yin, and 
Ed Zelinsky for their comments. 
I See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823, 
844-48 (2005). 
2 Cf Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 801, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3929-31 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 457A (West 2010)) (disallowing deferral for certain 
classes of deferred compensation); id. § 302(a), 122 Stat. at 3803-05 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 
162 (West 2010)) (disallowing deductions for executive compensation paid by firms participating 
in the Troubled Assets Relief Program, or T ARP); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115,517-21 (2009) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221 
(West 2010) (further limiting executive compensation by TARP participant firms). 
3 Articles exploring the taxation of executive compensation from a governance perspective 
include Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile 
Corporate Takeover Defenses: The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FLA. L. 
REv. 789, 825-27 (1988); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the 
Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (2007); James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and 
Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971 
(1992); Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to 
Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 141 (2002); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique 
of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881,35 VJLL. L. REv. 131 (1990). 
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timing of income, have received less attention.4 
The timing of income from executive compensation reemerged as a 
prime consideration after the passage of§ 409A of the Code in 2004.5 
Section 409A addressed deferred compensation plans, which allow 
executives to earn compensation in one year but pay tax in the future 
when they actually receive payment. Before § 409A, deferred 
compensation was barely-if at all-regulated by weak common law 
and regulatory doctrines that allowed employers and employees to defer 
the tax consequences of compensation nearly at will. With the passage 
of § 409A in 2004, however, employers' and employees' ability to 
achieve deferral was restricted. In the years to follow, there has been a 
flourishing of scholarship that examines the timing and character of 
income from executive compensation.6 The focus of this Article is on 
the timing of income from deferred compensation (also called 
nonqualified deferred compensation or executive pensions). It does not 
address other elements of executive compensation such as stock 
options,7 or the "carried interests" held by investment-fund managers.8 
A simple example can be used to explain the structure of deferred 
4 The classic account from the legal academy is Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: 
Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986), which analyzed several time-value 
of money transactions, including deferred compensation. Professor Halperin was also the first to 
call for a "special tax" on deferred compensation, a call reiterated and refined in this Article. The 
classic account from economics is Myron Scholes & Merton Miller, Executive Compensation, 
Taxes, and Incentives, in FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 179-
201 (1982). 
5 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 1634 
(2004). 
6 Works focusing on§ 409A include Steven J. Arsenault & W.R. Koprowski, The Policy of 
Regulating Deferral: A Critique in Light of Internal Revenue Code Section 409A, 7 Hous. Bus. 
& TAX L.J. 243 (2007); Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing The Fruit of the 
Tree in Its Proper Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347 (2006); Michael Doran, Time to Start Over on 
Deferred Compensation, 28 VA. TAX REv. 223 (2008); William A. Drennan, Enron-Inspired 
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Rules: "If You Don't Know Where You're Going, You 
Might Not Get There," 73 TENN. L. REv. 415 (2006); Richard Ehrhart, Section 409A-Treasury 
"Newspeak" Lost in the "Briar Patch," 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 743 (2006); Michael J. Hussey, 
Has Congress Stopped Executives from Raiding the Bank? A Critical Analysis of I.R. C. § 409A, 
75 UMKC L. REV. 437 (2006); Dana L. Trier, Rethinking the Taxation ofNonqualified Deferred 
Compensation: Code Sec. 409A, the Hedging Regulations and Code Sec. 1032, 84 TAXES 141 
(2006); Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of Deferred Compensation, 62 TAX L. 
REV. 377 (2009); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred 
Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571 (2007). 
7 My reluctance to address stock options comes from their vesting dynamics. The holder of 
a compensatory stock option is never truly vested in the option, because she must either forfeit or 
exercise the option upon termination of employment. See SIMON BENNINGA, FINANCIAL 
MODELING 467 (3d ed. 2008). This Article attempts to bifurcate deferred compensation into 
compensation and investment components, but bifurcating options is difficult (perhaps 
impossible) because of the vesting dynamics. 
8 Taxing deferred compensation is a pure timing issue, whereas carried interests involve 
characterization as capital gains and interactions with the partnership tax provisions of the Code. 
For background, see Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private 
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. l (2008). 
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compensation and give a rough outline of tax theory to date. Suppose 
that an executive and her employer are negotiating her salary for the 
following year. The employer gives the executive a choice between 
$100,000 of extra cash compensation paid one year later, or $200,000 of 
extra cash compensation paid ten years later. It should be no surprise 
that choosing the $100,000 immediate payment results in immediate 
taxation to the executive. Choosing the $200,000, however, allows the 
executive to defer the tax bill for ten years when actual payment occurs. 
The price of the executive's tax deferral, however, is that the employer 
must defer its deduction as well.9 
Ideally, there would be no tax advantage or disadvantage from 
deferred compensation, which would thrive or die based on its 
economic usefulness. So the primary issue for tax theorists is whether 
deferred compensation has any tax advantages at all. Because tax 
deferral forces the employer to defer its deduction, it is difficult to tell 
whether deferral is actually advantageous. One clear advantage is that 
some employees can essentially engage in income averaging, deferring 
current compensation into their retirement years when their marginal tax 
rates might be lower. 10 Another supposed advantage is that deferred 
compensation allows low-tax employers to hold investment assets as 
proxies for their high-tax employees. 11 
This Article attempts to build on prior work in the field to provide 
a more conceptual basis for understanding the tax advantages of 
deferred compensation. Toward this goal, this Article argues that 
deferred compensation is best viewed as a combination of compensation 
and investment components.12 An investment component must exist 
because employees would not ordinarily defer current compensation 
without the promise of interest or other investment potential. After 
breaking down deferred compensation into separate compensation and 
investment components, one can measure the adequacy of current law, 
because current law already provides straightforward rules for taxing 
simple compensation and investment transactions. 
The established rules for taxing these simple transactions provide 
the basis for the normative proposal of this Article. Differences in the 
taxation of equivalent transactions create tax-planning opportunities, 
which are almost always bad for society.J3 In brief, the existence of tax 
advantages attracts investments, potentially crowding out superior 
investments with higher pre-tax value. Indeed, tax planning itself 
9 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (West 2010). 
10 See infra Part II.D. 
II See infra Part II.A. 
12 See also Yale & Polsky, supra note 6, at 575 (referring to the "two components of deferred 
compensation arrangements, the investment yield and the compensatory element"). 
13 David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002). 
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involves the deployment of economic resources that could arguably be 
put to more productive use. Moreover, because only highly 
compensated employees can participate, 14 deferred compensation 
benefits only well-off taxpayers, threatening the distributive policy of 
the tax system. 
Thus, the primary measure of current law is how well it achieves 
parity with the taxation of the equivalent compensation and investment 
transactions. While current law adequately taxes the compensation 
component of deferred compensation, it fails to tax the investment 
component at all. In essence, deferred compensation allows employers 
and executives to opt out of the established system for taxing 
investment transactions. Using interest on debt as an example, deferred 
compensation effectively allows the employer to give tax-exempt 
interest to the employee, so long as the employer is willing to forgo its 
interest deduction. 
Armed with this insight, this Article sets out to cure the failure of 
current law and find a way to ensure neutrality between deferred 
compensation and the equivalent compensation and investment 
transactions. As deferred compensation can serve important nontax 
goals (like managing agency costs), reform should be administrable and 
cure the failures of current law without imposing any additional burdens 
on deferred compensation. These constraints lead to a proposal for 
imposing a "special tax" on the payment of deferred compensation. 
Unlike prior proposals, the special tax proposed in this Article would be 
levied only when deferred compensation is actually paid. Again, using 
interest as an example, the special tax eliminates the ability of the 
employer to grant tax-exempt interest to the employee. At the same 
time, the employer would see its interest deduction restored. 
In a prior article, this Author argued that employees should pay tax 
on deferred compensation at the highest marginal rate for individuals. 
The prior proposal, along with the one made in this Article, would 
effectively neutralize the tax advantages of deferred compensation. 
Passing these proposals would actually allow Congress to simplify the 
world of deferred compensation. The recent trend of legislative action 
has been to make deferral harder to achieve without altering the benefits 
of deferral; once achieved, however, deferral offers the same tax 
advantages that it always has. Eliminating those tax advantages would 
allow Congress to repeal the burdensome and ineffective system of 
regulating deferred compensation found in§ 409A of the Code. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a brief 
overview of deferred compensation and a framework for analyzing it. 
Deferred compensation is best viewed as a combination of debt and 
14 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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investment components, each giving rise to claims by the IRS. Part II 
summarizes prior proposals for taxing deferred compensation. Part III 
provides a conceptual framework for current-law taxation of deferred 
compensation. While current law adequately taxes the compensation 
component of deferred compensation, it does not tax the investment 
component at all. Part IV proposes a "special tax" that would cure this 
failure where the investment component of deferred compensation is a 
simple debt transaction. Part V expands and refines this proposal, 
making it applicable to a wide array of deferred compensation 
arrangements. The Conclusion contains some concluding remarks, as 
well as appendices containing some technical details. 
I. BACKGROUND ON DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
AND KINDRED ITEMS 
A Nonqualified Deferred Compensation: Taxation 
upon Actual Payment 
The essence of nonqualified deferred compensation is that an 
employer makes an unfunded promise to pay funds in the future in 
exchange for services received currently. If properly arranged, this 
unfunded promise does not result in current taxation to the employee, 
even if the promise is unqualified and made by a financially solvent 
employer. Is Only upon actual payment will the employee face any tax 
consequences, even if the right to payment was secured by services 
performed in a prior year. The lynchpin allowing the employee to avoid 
taxation until actual payment is the cash-method of accounting, under 
which a taxpayer generally pays tax only upon actual receipt of an item 
ofincome.t6 
The cash-method of accounting is subject to several conditions. It 
is possible (though rare) that an employee is subject to the accrual, not 
cash, method of accounting. 17 More significant limitations are the 
15 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174. 
16 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(l)(i) (as amended in 2006). 
17 Cf BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, 
AND GIFTS~ 105.4 ("Nearly all individuals and most unincorporated service businesses use cash 
accounting."). Under the accrual method a taxpayer has gross income when the taxpayer' s rights 
to the income have been secured and can be valued with reasonable accuracy. See Treas. Reg. § 
1.446-I(c)(l)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2006). Tax theorists usually regard the cash-method of 
accounting as inferior to the accrual method, but this view is not unanimous. See Joseph M. 
Dodge, Exploring the Income Tax Treatment of Borrowing and Liabilities, or Why the Accrual 
Method Should Be Eliminated, 26 VA. TAX. REv. 245 (2006). This Article concedes that accrual-
method taxation of individuals is unlikely to occur, and instead attempts to design a "special tax" 
that achieves rough parity with the accrual method. 
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doctrines of economic benefit and constructive receipt. The economic-
benefit doctrine will accelerate tax before actual payment if the 
employer irrevocably sets aside cash or property for the benefit of the 
employee. 18 An unfunded promise itself is not considered to be 
property and does not trigger the economic benefit doctrine. 19 
Similarly, the constructive-receipt doctrine will accelerate tax before 
actual payment if the employee could have immediate and unrestricted 
access to the funds.2o 
Historically, satisfying the two doctrines was the main goal in 
structuring deferred compensation arrangements.21 In 2004, however, 
Congress enacted § 409 A of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 which now 
extensively regulates deferred compensation.23 Rather than banning 
deferred compensation altogether, § 409A adds to the prior restrictions 
found in the constructive-receipt and economic-benefit doctrines.24 In 
broad terms, § 409A limits the ability of employees to elect both the 
initial deferral of compensation and the ultimate payment of amounts 
previously deferred. 25 The operational rules of § 409 A are quite 
complex and dominate the legal concerns of employers structuring 
deferred compensation plans. Fortunately, § 409A is largely irrelevant 
to the analysis ofthis Article. Section 409A regulates the types of plans 
that successfully defer compensation, but does nothing to alter the tax 
consequences of successful deferral. Moreover, the examples used in 
this Article are relatively simple deferred compensation arrangements 
that are not likely to raise difficult issues under § 409A or the prior 
judicial doctrines. 
Successful deferral of compensation results in the employee paying 
no tax when compensation is earned. Rather, tax is due only when the 
compensation is actually paid. This rule of deferral applies to the 
18 The economic-benefit doctrine is now largely (if not completely) codified in I.R.C. § 83 
and the related regulations. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005) (imposing tax upon 
the beneficiary of a "beneficial interest in assets (including money) which are transferred or set 
aside from the claims of creditors of the transferor, for example, in a trust or escrow account). 
19 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005). 
20 See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(b) (as amended in 1979). 
21 Cf T. David Cowart & Greta E. Cowart, Statutory Standards for Deferral under I.R.C. 
Section 409A, at§ 14.01(1), in BENDER'S FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PLANS 
(Alvin Lurie ed., 2008) ("Prior to the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 ... the taxation of deferred compensation was principally governed by Section 451 . .. and 
the judicial doctrines of constructive receipt and economic benefit."). 
22 American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 1634. 
23 See I.R.C. § 409A (West 2010). 
24 See I.R.S. Notice 2005-1 , 2005-1 C.B. 274 ("[Section] 409A does not alter or affect the 
application of any other provision of the Code or common law tax doctrine. Accordingly, 
deferred compensation not required to be included in income under§ 409A may nevertheless be 
required to be included in income under § 451, the constructive receipt doctrine, the cash 
equivalency doctrine, § 83, the economic benefit doctrine, the assignment of income doctrine or 
any other applicable provision of the Code or common law tax doctrine."). 
25 See Cowart & Cowart, supra note 21, ~ 14.01[1]. 
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employer as well, even if it uses the accrual method of accounting. 26 
Example 1: It is 2008, and Ray Corp. is negotiating compensation 
with a senior executive, Emily. Ray Corp. will pay Emily a salary of 
at least $1,000,000 in 2009. Also, Ray Corp. will either pay an 
additional $100,000 in 2009, or promise to pay Emily $200,000 in 
2019 (in lieu of the $100,000 of additional compensation). Agreeing 
to the deferral, Emily is taxed on $1 ,000,000 in 2009 and $200,000 
in 20 19. Ray Corp. takes corresponding deductions in the same 
years. 
Note that Emily does not pay tax on the full $1,100,000 in 2009, 
even though there is strong evidence that this is the value of her 2009 
pay package. Although such arrangements are now extensively 
regulated by § 409A, the basic tax consequences remain the same as 
they have for decades. Emily has, in substance, earned an extra 
$100,000 in 2009, but she pays no tax on this amount until 2019 when 
she receives the original $100,000, plus an additional $100,000 
representing the time value of money. Ray Corp. bears a cost from 
agreeing to this deferral, as it must wait until 2019 to deduct the 
compensation. 27 
B. The Scholes-Wolfson Model: The Three Perspectives 
of Executive Compensation 
The interesting question about deferred compensation is whether 
deferral is valuable to taxpayers. From the perspective of the employee 
alone, deferral is quite valuable, as evidenced by the popularity of 
Individual Retirement Accounts, 401(k) plans, and the like. From the 
perspective of the employer, however, deferral is potentially onerous. 
The employer will usually need to defer any deduction on the 
compensation until the time that the employee includes the 
compensation in income. Thus, whether tax deferral is advantageous is 
not immediately clear, as it must be examined from the perspective of 
both the employer and employee. 
What is needed, then, is a method to examine taxes from the joint 
perspective of the parties, asking whether the tax savings to the 
employee outweigh the tax detriments to the employer. The joint (or 
"global" as the authors put it) perspective is the hallmark of the 
"Scholes-Wolfson model," named for the two original coauthors of 
Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach.28 As the authors 
26 I.R.C. § 404(a)(5). 
27 !d. 
28 MYRON S . SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 
(4th ed. 2009). 
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say: 
[W]e adopt a global planning approach [to taxes and business 
strategy] .... [T]here are three aspects of planning globally: 
1. Multilateral approach: All contracting parties must be taken into 
account in tax planning. This is a global or multilateral, rather than 
unilateral, approach. 
2. Importance of hidden taxes: All taxes must be taken into account. 
We are interested in a global measure of taxes, not simply explicit 
taxes. 
3. Importance of nontax costs: All costs of business must be 
considered, not just tax cost. 29 
This Article will not consider hidden taxes or nontax costs.3o 
Instead, it will examine the federal-income-tax treatment of deferred 
compensation from a joint perspective, including the tax treatment of 
both employer and employee. 
The Scholes-Wolfson model views taxes as an item to be planned 
around by private parties. All else being equal, the private parties will 
attempt to minimize the claim of the tax authority. The authors say: 
All of the interesting problems in tax planning arise because, from 
the standpoint of individual taxpaying entities, the taxing authority is 
an uninvited party to all contracts. The taxing authority brings to 
each of its "forced" ventures with taxpayers a set of contractual 
terms (tax rules). Unlike other contracting parties, the taxing 
authority generally does not negotiate these terms separately for each 
venture. . . . Instead, it announces a standard set of terms taxpayers 
must accept. In addition, although the taxing authority claims a 
partnership interest in taxpayer profits, it exercises no voting rights. 
Nor does it directly monitor taxpayer performance to determine 
whether taxpayers are violating the contractual terms. Of course, the 
taxing authority does conduct audits. 31 
If one focuses solely on the federal income tax, deferred 
compensation involves three parties: employer, employee, and the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). (Of course, the IRS is itself agent for 
the claims of American society at large.) The employer and employee 
have every incentive to act in concert so as to minimize the IRS's share 
of transactions. Unlike private parties, policymakers should not set out 
to maximize what the IRS receives. Rather, they should seek to protect 
the IRS's proper share of transactions. The question then becomes: 
What share of transactions properly belongs to the IRS? 
29 !d. at 3. 
30 I am agnostic as to whether hidden taxes or nontax costs are important to deferred 
compensation. Important work does, however, link those costs to important policy concerns. 
See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for the Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax 
System as Measured by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. REv. 13 (2003); David M. Schizer, Frictions as 
a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1312 (2001). 
31 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 28. 
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The Scholes-Wolfson model simplifies policymaking by focusing 
our attention on the IRS's claims to transactions rather than individual 
parties. One can safely disregard any fairness concerns about the 
allocation of tax burdens of the executive or the employer because the 
parties are financially sophisticated and able to adjust their transaction 
in response to the formal incidence of any tax. Given a certain 
transaction, all that is important is that the IRS will receive its share. 
For basic transactions (like cash compensation or interest payments), 
the proper share of the IRS is determined by larger, societal goals 
surrounding the tax system. 32 Basic transactions under the Scholes-
Wolfson model are inherently impervious to tax planning. A contract 
for cash wages, payable as services are rendered, has clear tax 
consequences that are not easily avoidable. 
Deferred compensation, in contrast, is a combination of wage and 
investment elements. The essence of deferred compensation is that the 
employer performs services today in exchange for cash in the future, 
and the employee will require that amounts currently deferred be 
augmented by some reasonable investment return.33 Recall that in 
Example 1 above, Emily had a choice between compensation of 
$100,000 today or $200,000 in ten years. Thus, the deferred 
compensation contract gives Emily $100,000 of compensation, plus 
$100,000 of investment return. In this example, the investment return is 
a certain sum, closely analogous to a promissory note. Indeed, Emily's 
return could be perfectly replicated by a combination of current wages 
and an interest-bearing promissory note. Ray Corp. could pay current 
cash wages, and Emily could then lend the wages to Ray Corp. for an 
interest-bearing promissory note. Thus, there are two transactions 
(deferred compensation and a wage/note combination) that produce 
identical cash flows absent taxes. 
Despite their economic equivalence, the two transactions are 
subject to different tax treatment. Obviously, if the transaction is 
structured as wages and a promissory note, the IRS will have a tax 
claim to both elements. As discussed in Part III below, however, the 
taxes imposed on deferred compensation are usually less than the taxes 
imposed on the equivalent wage/note combination. Deferred 
compensation may be equivalent to a wage/note combination, but 
current law limits the IRS's claim to the wage element only. This 
Article, therefore, proposes a "special tax" on deferred compensation 
that recognizes the IRS's claim to the investment element of deferred 
32 See, e.g., BITIKER & LOKKEN: FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ch. 3 
(discussing basics of federal tax policy). For a summary of the IRS's share of basic transactions, 
see infra Part I. C. 
33 An exception would exist if future tax rates were so much lower that the employee would 
be willing to forgo the time-value of money. 
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compensation as well, thus minimizing the tax differences between the 
two equivalent transactions. 
Policymakers should attempt to minimize (if not eliminate) the tax 
differences between the equivalent transactions for reasons of equity 
and efficiency. Negating tax planning achieves horizontal equity by 
ensuring equivalent tax treatment of taxpayers who engage in equivalent 
economic activities. The tax savings from deferred compensation may 
not be available to self employed or retired workers. Because only 
highly compensated employees can participate,34 deferred compensation 
threatens vertical equity as well. As for efficiency concerns, the 
existence of tax advantages attracts investments, potentially crowding 
out superior investments with higher pre-tax value. Similarly, tax 
planning itself involves the deployment of economic resources that 
could arguably be put to more productive use. 
The Code, of course, explicitly encourages tax planning in many 
cases. The "deferred compensation" of this Article refers to plans that 
do not quality for the very significant tax benefits of § 401(a) and 
similar provisions. Plans that do quality (such as 401(k) plans, ESOPs, 
and defined benefit pensions )35 are advantaged over deferred 
compensation36 in at least two ways. First, the employer can 
irrevocably set aside funds for the employee, free from the claims of the 
employer's creditors, without triggering current taxation to the 
employee and without subjecting the funds to any income tax.37 
Second, the employer can deduct the expense of qualified retirement 
plans before the employee pays tax on the benefits. Even with the 
limits of§ 409A, however, deferred compensation is more flexible than 
qualified retirement plans, which have limits on the amounts of 
benefits38 and restrictions on the amounts that can be offered to highly 
compensated employees.39 
In contrast to the advantages Congress grants to 401 (k) plans and 
the like, any tax advantages for nonqualified deferred compensation are 
unintentional. Deferred compensation is extended primarily to highly 
compensated employees, and there is no reason that either they or their 
employers should receive a tax break from the deferral. At the same 
time, deferred compensation may well have non-tax benefits, such as 
the control of agency costs. Just as there is no reason to encourage 
these arrangements, there is no reason for Congress to impose punitive 
taxes on them either. The premise of this Article is that policymakers 
34 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
35 I.R.C. § 40I(a) (West 2010). 
36 As used in tills Article, deferred compensation is synonymous with nonqua1ified deferred 
compensation. 
37 See Chason, supra note 6, at 361-62. 
38 See I.R.C. § 415 (West 2010). 
39 See id. §§ 401(a)(4), 410(b). 
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should strive to tax deferred compensation in the same manner that they 
tax an equivalent transaction composed of simple cash wages and an 
investment contract. 
C. Taxation of "Basic" Compensation and Investment Transactions 
1. Introduction 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to break up deferred 
compensation transactions into separate compensation and debt 
components. Once the transactions are so divided, it becomes possible 
to apply the ordinary tax rules applicable to compensation and interest 
to those separate transactions, and then to compare those results with 
the results that current law provides for deferred compensation. 
Readers should be aware that the focus on debt is a simplifying 
assumption. The investment component of deferred compensation can 
also be based on a myriad of investment returns, such as employer 
stock. Such non-debt deferred compensation arrangements are like 
forward contracts, which are derivatives that roughly replicate the 
returns on owning an asset.40 Ultimately, this Article will argue that 
every deferred compensation plan can be thought of as a combination of 
current compensation, debt, and forward-contract elements.41 
Part I.C provides a very brief overview of the taxation of 
compensation, debt, and forward-contract transactions. In addition, Part 
I.C describes the net economic claim that the IRS has from these 
transactions. This Article focuses on the net claim of the IRS because 
compensation and debt transactions involve two taxpayers, who--in the 
context of deferred compensation-are both financially sophisticated 
and well-off. Therefore, there should be no equitable concerns about 
assigning tax liability to one or the other. Moreover, the parties can 
quite easily shift the nominal tax burden between them contractually. 
The controlling tax rules are thus irrelevant, so long as the net claim of 
the IRS is the same. In short, what matters is what the IRS receives, not 
the identity of the taxpayers. 
To illustrate the methodology, this Article views wages, debt, and 
forward contracts as private-party transactions giving rise to claims by 
the IRS. An executive might give up to 35% of her wages to the federal 
government, along with 35% of her interest income. This claim of the 
government is not, however, a net winner in every situation. For every 
40 Cf ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 19 (6th ed. 2005) (describing "forward-type 
contracts" as "'price fixing' agreements that saddle the buyer with the same price risks as actually 
owning the asset"). 
41 See infra Part V.B. 
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employee there is an employer, for every lender a borrower. These 
counterparties often (but not always) deduct the wages and interest on 
which the employees and lenders pay tax. Thus, if an employer and 
employee are both paying tax at 35%, the payment of wages leads to no 
income tax to the government. 
A brief word is in order on how to determine the net claim. The 
net value of the IRS's claim to compensation and debt transactions turns 
on the "marginal tax rate" faced by parties to the transaction. As used 
in this Article, the term marginal tax rate is an economic, not statutory, 
concept, referring to the present value of income taxes (current or 
future) to be paid on one dollar of additional taxable income.42 The 
marginal tax rate is not the average (or so-called effective) tax rate. 
Effective tax rates are relevant in determining whether certain taxpayers 
are paying too much or too little in taxes, but they are not relevant to 
determining the incremental taxes paid or saved from discrete 
transactions. 
Because deferred compensation is almost always granted to highly-
compensated employees,43 this Article assumes that the marginal tax 
rate of employees is the top statutory rate (currently 35%).44 
Admittedly, this is crude and over-inclusive, but only somewhat. 
Federal pension law bars employers from offering deferred 
compensation to rank-and-file employees.45 Regrettably, the 
Department of Labor has never specified a compensation level that 
triggers eligibility for deferred compensation,46 but $245,000 is 
probably a de facto safe harbor.47 Everyone at that level of income is in 
the 33% bracket, at least.48 So the assumption does lead to some error, 
though to a tolerable degree. 
Turning to the employer, this Article will assume that the employer 
is a publicly traded corporation. Like individuals, corporations pay a 
42 Cf MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING 
APPROACH 204 (4th ed. 2009) ("We defme the marginal tax rate as the present value of current 
plus deferred income taxes ... to be paid per dollar of additional (or marginal) taxable income."). 
43 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
44 See I.R.C. § l(a)-(e), (i)(2). Of course, high-income taxpayers may see their marginal tax 
rates fall in retirement as they earn less income. In this Article, I will generally assume that 
marginal tax rates remain static over time. 
45 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
46 See MICHAELS. SIRKIN & LAWRENCE K. CAGNEY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION§ 7.03[2] 
("The question of what constitutes a 'select group of management or highly compensated 
employees' has not been the subject of any definitive construction by the Department of Labor, 
which is the government agency with authority to administer Title I of ERISA, nor in court 
decisions."). 
47 Deferred compensation plans often grant benefits that carmot be granted by qualified 
retirement plans once the employee earns more than the pay limit imposed by I.R.C. § 401(a)(l7). 
See id. § 7.04[1]. For 2009, the pay limit is $245,000. See IRS Armounces Pension Plan 
Limitations for 2009, I.R.S. News Release IR-2008-118 (Oct. 16, 2008). 
48 See Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 § 3.01. 
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maximum statutory rate of 35%,49 but there is good evidence that many 
publicly traded corporations face marginal tax rates lower than 35%.50 
Unlike executives, corporations are not amenable to a universal 
assumption about their tax rates. Recall that the marginal tax rate, as an 
economic matter, is the present value of income taxes (current or future) 
to be paid on one dollar of additional taxable income. 51 A firm with a 
current loss might have no additional current taxes paid from an extra 
dollar ofincome,52 yet an additional dollar of income will reduce the net 
operating losses (NOLs) that it accumulates. These NOLs can be 
carried forward to future years to reduce future tax liabilities. 53 Once 
the firm becomes profitable, the NOLs can be "cashed in" against 
statutory taxes. So an additional dollar of income for a firm operating at 
a loss does result in additionalfuture taxes that the firm must pay. If the 
statutory rate is 35%, the firm will face an additional tax of 35¢ at some 
point in the future. Of course, this 35¢ must be discounted to present 
value, and there is considerable difficulty of forecasting exactly when 
this future tax will be paid. 54 
Financial economists have estimated the marginal tax rates that 
actual corporations face, ranging from 0% to 35% (the main statutory 
rate for corporations).55 If the corporation pays tax at the employee's 
rate (assumed to be 35%), then the IRS has no net claim to the 
investment component of deferred compensation. Deferred 
compensation becomes interesting only if the rate is lower than the 
employee's rate (assumed to be 35%). For purposes of illustration, this 
Article will frequently use a 20% marginal tax rate for its examples, 
though the ultimate proposal of this Article will tum on the employer's 
marginal tax rate at the time of payment. 56 
49 I.R.C. § ll(b)(l)(D). 
50 The possible reasons for the disparity include net operating losses, leverage, and tax 
shelters. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 42, at 204-10; Johnson, supra note 30 (arguing that 
relatively high returns on municipal bonds implies low economic tax rates). 
51 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
52 Net operating losses can be carried back two years and forward twenty years. See I.R.C. § 
172(b)(l). If the firm can carry the NOLs back to a prior year, they can be cashed in 
immediately. For such a firm, the marginal tax rate is the statutory rate. See SCHOLES ET AL. , 
supra note 28, at 205. 
53 See LR.C. §I72(b)(l). 
54 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 28, at 205-06. 
55 See John R. Graham et al., Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy, 59 
J. FIN. 1585, 1603 (2004). 
56 See infra text accompanying note 132. 
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2. IRS's Compensation Claim 
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code expressly taxes 
"[ c ]ompensation for services" as gross income, 57 thus subjecting the 
recipient of cash compensation to taxation.58 The broad principle of 
inclusion to the employee has a counterpart: Compensation expenses are 
generally deductible by employers. Under § 162(a), an employer may 
deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during 
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including-{ I) a 
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal 
services actually rendered."59 The employers that are likely to offer 
deferred compensation usually face few obstacles in deducting 
compensation expenses. Accordingly, this Article generally assumes 
the payment of compensation is fully deductible under§ 162(a). 
Section 162(m) does, however, limit the deduction by a publicly 
held corporation on amounts paid to its CEO and three other highest 
paid officers, 60 as the corporation can deduct only $1 ,000,000 of annual 
salary paid to each of these four officers.61 A significant attraction of 
deferred compensation is avoiding the § 162(m) limit. A $10,000,000 
salary for a public-corporation CEO is not deductible if paid currently. 
Yet the corporation and CEO might agree to defer $9,000,000 of the 
salary to the year after the CEO retires. At the time of payout, the CEO 
would be a former CEO and no longer subject to the limits of § 
l62(m).62 The CEO could be made whole with time-value-of-money 
adjustments, and the corporation could take a full deduction for the 
post-retirement payout. 
In conceptualizing the IRS's net claim to compensation, this 
Article ignores the § 162(m) limit. Accounting for the § 162(m) limit 
57 I.R.C. § 6l(a). 
58 The receipt of vested property and like-kind benefits also subjects the recipient to tax. 
l.R.C. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-l(a) (as 
amended in 2003). Similarly, courts have held that an employer's payment of an employee's 
obligations (for example, the employee's tax liability) is itself gross income. See, e.g., Old 
Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
59 I.R.C. § 162(a). 
60 The Code itself limits deductions for the "covered employees," defined to be the CEO and 
the four most highly compensated officers whose compensation must be reported under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3). In 2006, however, the 
SEC amended its disclosure rules to cover the CEO, CFO, and the three most highly compensated 
officers. In response to the SEC change, the IRS issued a notice stating that it would treat only 
the CEO and the three most highly compensated employees as covered employees. I.R.S. Notice 
2007-49,2007-1 C.B. 1429 (June 18, 2007). 
61 I.R.C. § 162(m). 
62 But see I.R.C. § 162(m)(5}(A)(ii) (disallowing deductions for deferred compensation over 
$500,000 for top executives of firms participating in T ARP). 
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would unduly complicate the "special tax" ultimately proposed by this 
Article. Moreover, since § 162(m) arguably implements non-tax 
policies of improving corporate governance, rather than the tax policy 
of ensuring the IRS's claim to compensation transactions, 63 its reach is 
beyond the main concerns of this Article. 
By assuming fully deductible compensation, it is possible to focus 
on the amount of the IRS's net claim to compensation transactions, 
which will turn on the difference in marginal tax rates faced by 
employer and employee. If the employer and employee face the same 
marginal tax rate, then the IRS has no claim to the compensation. If, 
however, the employer faces a lower tax rate, the IRS has a positive net 
claim. Consider the following examples: 
Example 2: Emily is employed by Ray Corp. at an annual salary of 
$1,100,000. Both Emily and Ray Corp. face a 35% marginal tax 
rate. Emily must pay tax in the amount of $350,000, but Ray Corp. 
gets a deduction worth $350,000. Thus, the IRS has no net claim to 
the compensation. 
Example 3: Same as Example 2, except that Emily faces a 35% 
marginal tax rate and Ray Corp. only 20%. As before, Emily pays 
tax in the amount of $350,000. But Ray Corp. now has a deduction 
worth only $200,000. Thus, the IRS has a net claim to the 
compensation in the amount of$150,000. 
Generalizing from these examples, the net claim of the IRS turns 
on the amount of compensation and the difference in tax rates between 
the parties. In Example 2, the tax rates were equal, and the IRS had no 
net claim. In Example 3, the compensation was $1,000,000, and the 
difference in rates was 15% (35%- 20%); thus, the IRS's net claim was 
$150,000. 
The IRS would have a net liability from compensation if the 
employee has a lower tax rate than the employer. This Article, dealing 
with the compensation of executives, makes the conservative 
assumption that paying compensation is either revenue-neutral or 
revenue-producing. Executives will typically be at the highest marginal 
tax rate of 35%, which is also the highest corporate tax rate. If both 
employer and employee are at the 35% rate, then compensation is 
revenue neutral. The corporation may, however, be at a lower marginal 
tax rate than its executives because it is not very profitable, or because it 
has net operating losses that absorb current income.64 
63 Examples of the corporate governance scholarship surrounding § 162(m) are given supra 
note 3. 
64 See supra note 42. 
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3. IRS's Interest Claim 
Simple deferred compensation plans can be analogized to a formal 
loan between the employer (as borrower) and employee (as lender). 
This Part briefly examines the taxation of interest, assuming a high-
income, individual creditor and a corporate borrower. Interest paid or 
received on indebtedness follows a pattern similar to that of salary and 
other compensation-it is generally deductible by the borrower65 and 
taxable to the creditor.66 Like compensation income, interest income is 
taxed to individuals at a maximum 35% tax rate, and this Article 
generally assumes that the individual is subject to the 35% rate for all 
periods. As for the corporate borrower, the value of its interest 
deduction will depend on its marginal tax rate, which may be 35% or 
lower. As a result, the IRS's net claim to a debt transaction is like its 
claim to a simple compensation transaction. Recall that with a 
compensation transaction, the IRS has a net claim based on the amount 
of compensation multiplied by the difference in tax rates between 
employer and employee. Similarly, the IRS's claim to a debt 
transaction is based on the amount of annual interest multiplied by the 
difference in rates between the debtor and creditor. 
Example 4: Emily loans $200,000 to Ray Corp. for five years at 5% 
(or $1 0,000) annual interest. Both Emily and Ray Corp. face a 35% 
marginal tax rate. Emily must pay tax in the amount of $3500, but 
Ray Corp. gets a deduction worth $3500. Thus, the IRS has no net 
claim to the interest payments. 
Example 5: Same as Example 4, except that Emily faces a 35% 
marginal tax rate and Ray Corp. only 20%. As before, Emily pays 
tax in the amount of $3500. But Ray Corp. now has a deduction 
worth $2000. Thus, the IRS has a net claim to the compensation in 
the amount of$1500. 
As with compensation transactions, the IRS's net claim is based on 
the difference in marginal tax rates. When the tax rates are the same, 
the IRS has no net claim. When the creditor's rate is higher than the 
debtor's, then the net claim is equal to the amount of interest multiplied 
by the difference in marginal tax rates. 
Even if cash interest payments do not actually change hands, 
borrowers and lenders usually recognize imputed interest every year 
under the original issue discount (OlD) rules.67 The most basic form of 
OlD is derived from zero coupon bonds. 
Example 6: Emily loans $200,000 to Ray Corp. for five years. No 
65 I.R.C. § 163(a). 
66 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4). 
67 I.R.C. §§ 1272(a)(l), 163(e)(l). 
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interest is due until the end of five years, at which time Ray Corp. 
will repay Emily $200,000, plus accumulated interest of $50,000. 
The marginal tax rates of Emily and Ray Corp. are 35% and 20%, 
respectively. Because of the OlD rules, Emily and Ray Corp. must 
recognize interest (income and expense) of about $10,000 every year 
over the five years of the loan.68 The IRS will receive its net claim 
of about $1500 every year. 
1683 
Regardless of the operation of the OlD rules, the IRS will have a 
net claim of $7500 to the interest on the debt, based on 15% of the 
$50,000 interest that passes from Ray Corp. to Emily. The OlD rules 
simply coordinate the timing of the net claim, in effect placing both 
Emily and Ray Corp. on the accrual method of accounting for interest. 
Without this coordination, Emily (otherwise on the cash method) would 
have waited until the final payment before being taxed on $50,000 
interest. Yet Ray Corp. would have received the benefit of deductions 
over the course of the loan. Thus, the IRS would face the liability of 
Ray Corp.'s interest deductions before it could tax Emily's 
corresponding interest income. The OlD rules prevent this temporal 
mismatch, forcing both Emily and Ray Corp. to recognize annual 
interest. 
4. IRS's Forward-Contract Claim 
Some types of deferred compensation provide investment returns 
based on the performance of employer equity or other non-debt 
investments.69 Because the employee does not actually own the 
employer equity or other investment, the employee essentially holds a 
derivative. As explained below,70 the relevant derivative is aforward 
contract, which is a "contract that obligates the holder to buy or sell an 
asset for a predetermined delivery price at a predetermined future 
time."71 The forward price is the "delivery price in a forward contract 
that causes the contract to be worth zero."72 The following example 
illustrates a forward contract: 
Example 7: In 2009, Emily and Ray Corp. enter into a forward 
contract under which Emily agrees to buy 10,000 shares of Ray 
Corp. stock in 2019. Emily agrees to a delivery price of $2,000,000. 
The current value of Ray Corp. stock is $100 per share, and the 
prevailing interest rate is 7.2%, compounded annually. The forward 
68 The annual interest would not be exactly $10,000 per year. Precise methodology for 
calculating OlD can be found at Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-l(b)(l) (1996). 
69 See supra Part V.B. 
70 See id. 
71 JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FuTuRES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 781 (7th ed. 2009). 
72 /d. 
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price of I 0,000 Ray Corp. shares, deliverable in ten years, is 
$2,000,000.73 Since the delivery price is the forward price, Emily 
pays nothing to enter into the contract. 
Since Ray Corp. is dealing in its own stock, it is functionally tax-
exempt with respect to its gain or loss under the contract.74 The IRS's 
net claim will tum completely on Emily's tax consequences. To 
simplify matters, assume that Emily and Ray Corp. agree that they will 
settle the contract in cash in 2019, meaning Emily will not actually buy 
Ray Corp. stock. So if the stock is worth less than $2,000,000 in 2019, 
Emily will pay the difference in cash; if it is worth more, Ray Corp. will 
do so. Because the contract is cash-settled, Emily will be forced to 
recognize all gain or loss for tax purposes in 2019. 
The forward contract will be a capital asset in Emily's hands, 
producing long-term capital gain or loss.75 Emily's gain would be taxed 
at the 15% rate,76 but it is difficult to generalize about the value of 
Emily' s losses because taxpayers are limited in their use of capital 
losses.77 This Article assumes, however, that any losses Emily incurs 
produce a deduction worth 15% of the loss. Though this is an 
assumption made in order to facilitate a clean analysis, it is not 
unreasonable, because long-term capital losses can always be used to 
offset long-term capital gains. 78 
Under this assumption, the IRS essentially owns 15% of Emily's 
forward contract. It enjoys 15% of any gain and is responsible for 15% 
of any loss. From an ex ante perspective in 2009, this 15% share is 
arguably worth nothing. After all, Emily paid nothing to enter into the 
contract, and 15% of nothing is nothing. In 2019, of course, the IRS 
may actually gain or lose depending on the performance of Ray Corp. 
In 2009, however, the IRS has nothing of inherent value.79 
As explained below, ignoring the IRS's claim to the forward-
contract element of deferred compensation greatly simplifies the 
normative proposals of this Article. Based on the foregoing analysis, 
doing so does not prejudice the IRS, because its forward-contract claim 
is not inherently valuable. Admittedly, this conclusion is based on the 
73 The current (spot) price of 10,000 shares is $1,100,000. The forward price for a non-
dividend-paying stock is the future value of the spot price. See id. In our case, that future value 
$1,000,000 X 1.07210 = $2,000,000. 
74 See I.R.C. § 1032 (West 2010). 
75 The fact that the contract is cash-settled should not negate its status as a capital asset. See 
DAVID H. SHAPIRO, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 188-1ST: TAXATION OF EQUITY 
DERIVATIVES, at Il .B.3.a ("Cash-settlement payments should also be capital gain and loss to the 
respective recipient and payor."). 
76 See I.R.C. § II (b)( 1 )(A). 
77 See l.R.C. § 12ll(b). 
78 See id. 
79 This account is consistent with the "Domar-Musgrave" theory, which holds that taxpayers 
can avoid taxes levied on risky assets. See infra Part II. C. 
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assumption that taxpayers can fully use their capital losses against 
capital gains and that the IRS's 15% claim should be valued in the same 
manner as a single investor's. Because of these limitations, this Article 
does not argue that the IRS should be out of the business of taxing 
forward contracts per se. Rather, it argues that ignoring the forward-
contract element of deferred compensation contracts is an acceptable 
compromise, made to further the development of a normative proposal 
that will ensure that the IRS receives its claim to the investment income 
inherent in deferred compensation. 
II. PRIOR PROPOSALS REGARDING THE TAXATION 
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A Annually Tax Investment Income Associated 
with Deferred Compensation 
Some scholars have likened deferred compensation to an 
investment conduit by which the employee can essentially have her 
investment income taxed at the employer's tax rate.so This Article 
refers to this view as the "conduit theory" of deferred compensation. 
The employer acts as something of a conduit when it sets funds aside in 
a "rabbi trust"-namely, a trust securing payment of deferred 
compensation benefits. The rabbi trust avoids the economic benefit 
doctrine by subjecting the assets to the claims of the employer's general 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency. Because the 
employer retains a benefit from the potential payment of its general 
creditors, the trust is a "grantor trust" and disregarded for federal 
income tax purposes.si 
Example 8: In 2008, Emma, a corporate executive, and her 
employer, Rex Corp., are negotiating Emma's 2009 compensation. 
Emma and Rex Corp. agree that Emma will defer $100,000 of her 
2009 compensation, and Rex Corp. will set those funds aside in a 
rabbi trust for Emma's benefit. Rex Corp. is a functionally tax-
exempt U.S. corporation, whereas Emma pays tax at the 35% 
bracket. Rex Corp. agrees to invest the assets of the rabbi trust in 
taxable bonds that pay annual, pre-tax interest of 7.2%. At the end 
of ten years, Rex Corp. pays Emily the balance of the trust, which 
has grown to $200,000.82 In 2019, Rex Corp. pays $200,000 to 
80 See Polsky & Yale, supra note 6, at 607 ("The standard for neutrality is what would have 
occurred had the employee been paid cash and invested for her own account outside of the 
deferred compensation context."). 
81 See Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation 
Plans, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 524-25 (2002). 
82 $)00,000 X 1.07210 = $200,000. 
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Emma, who keeps $130,000 after paying tax of 35%. 
This example can be contrasted with what would happen if Emma 
took current compensation and invested in the bonds directly. Emma 
would pay tax of 35% tax in 2009 and have $65,000 of cash to invest in 
the bonds. Unlike tax-exempt Rex Corp., which enjoys a 7.2% rate of 
return after-tax, Emma's return is reduced by 35% down to 4.68%. 
After ten years of direct investing, Emma's $65,000 would grow to 
about $103,000.83 Thus, deferred compensation gives Emma about 
$27,000 more in 2019. 
Essentially, the rabbi trust allows Emma to piggyback on Rex 
Corp.'s tax-exempt status while investing. Because of their different 
tax rates, Rex Corp. can earn 7.2% from the bonds, but Emma only 
4.68%. The rabbi trust allows Emma to invest at Rex Corp.'s after-tax 
return of7.2%.84 Deferral has nothing to do with the tax benefit. 
The conduit theory has led scholars to call for a special tax to be 
levied on the investment income associated with deferred 
compensation. 85 These scholars do not advocate abandoning deferral 
altogether, but rather taxing the investment component of deferred 
compensation on an annual basis. The purpose of such a tax would be 
to replicate the claim the IRS would have if the rabbi trust assets were 
taxable to the employee rather than the employer. However, these 
proposals are at tension with the economic benefit doctrine and the 
regulations under § 83.86 The doctrinal counterargument is that rabbi 
trust assets must be subject to the claims of the employer's creditors, 
and that these claims prevent the employee from being taxed on the 
rabbi trust assets. 87 This counterargument is not merely a doctrinal 
impediment to reform, as benefiting from a rabbi trust is substantively 
different from outright ownership of the trust assets because the 
employee faces the risk of employer insolvency.88 Instead, the 
employee is a creditor of the employer, rather than the owner of assets. 
Moreover, not all deferred compensation is funded by rabbi trusts, 
and unfunded deferred compensation presents a serious challenge to the 
83 $65,000 X 1.046810 = $103,000. 
84 To confirm, suppose that Emma received $100,000 in 2009, paid her taxes of $35,000, and 
invested the remaining $65,000 in bonds that paid 7.2% after-tax. In ten years, her money would 
double, see infra note 112, and she would have $130,000. This is the same payoff that she 
received from the rabbi trust. 
85 See Yale & Polsky, supra note 6. 
86 See I.R.C. § 83. 
87 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005). 
88 Moreover, the rabbi-trust structure requires that the employee remain illiquid and unable to 
convert trust assets into consumption at will. Indeed, § 409A codifies employee illiquidity by 
restricting the ability of employees to withdraw funds from deferred compensation plans. 
Liquidity is not a necessary condition for taxing property transfers under section 83, which 
imposes tax when the property is either transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture. See I.R.C. § 83(a)(l) (West 2010). 
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conduit theory. Professors Yale and Polsky respond by advocating a 
marked-to-market tax on deferred compensation. 89 The problem with 
this approach is that it would force employers to value deferred 
compensation before actual payout, even though deferred compensation 
often has an ambiguous value. Once employers are forced to derive a 
value for deferred compensation, the logical next step is to abandon 
deferral altogether.9° Professor Halperin avoids the valuation problem 
through a proposal to mandate the use of rabbi trusts.91 Such a mandate 
would effectively force employers to fund deferred compensation just as 
they are required to fund qualified retirement plans.n Mandated 
funding intrudes upon the contractual relationship between employer 
and employee, however, and serves no apparent non-tax goal beyond 
creating a pool of assets that may be taxed. 
Ultimately, this Article proceeds without concerning itself with 
rabbi-trust funding. If rabbi-trust funding were relevant, the appropriate 
response would be to broaden § 83 and the economic-benefit doctrine in 
order to reach it, essentially leading to accrual accounting for deferred 
compensation.93 The approach of this Article, however, is to suggest 
minimal changes to current law that would eliminate the tax advantage 
of deferred compensation. First, though, it is necessary to clarify what 
the tax advantage really is, and the conduit theory points in the right 
direction. There is a tax advantage to deferred compensation that exists 
when extended from a low-tax employer to a high-tax employee. That 
advantage should not be measured by reference to rabbi-trust funding, 
whether real or hypothetical, but rather by reference to the contract that 
exists between the employer and the employee. 
B. Place Executives on the Accrual Method of Accounting 
The most direct way to eliminate the tax advantages of deferral is 
to eliminate deferral altogether by placing executive-level employees on 
the accrual method of accounting. This approach contrasts with current 
law, which allows deferral for a select class of arrangements. Professor 
Michael Doran writes: 
Accrual-based taxation, which follows directly from the Haig-
Simons definition of income, presents the correct result as a matter 
of tax policy. That approach treats deferred compensation-
regardless of whether it is "good" or "bad" (in the sense of satisfying 
89 See Yale & Polsky, supra note 6, at 610. 
90 See infra Part II. B. 
91 See Halperin, supra note 4, at 549. 
92 Cf I.R.C. §§ 430-432 (establishing funding requirements for defmed benefit plans). 
93 See infra Part II.B. 
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or not satisfying an arbitrary set of statutory requirements)-just like 
current compensation. In other words, accrual-based taxation 
eliminates the possibility of a tax preference for deferred 
compensation.94 
Presumably, certain technical details would have to be dealt with, 
like the treatment of investment earnings and the exact timing of 
income-inclusion when the employee is not vested. 
Thirty years ago, Congress quashed an IRS attempt to tax deferred 
compensation plans that were elective on the part of the employee.95 
Political sentiment is different today, and Congress made nascent moves 
toward accrual accounting for deferred compensation with the passage 
of I.R.C. § 457 A in 2008.96 Section 457 A applies to a very limited class 
of deferred compensation plans, namely those offered by foreign 
corporations and partnerships with tax-exempt investors. Still, the 
existence of the statute shows some willingness on the part of Congress 
to put deferred compensation on the accrual method. 
There are, however, objections to accrual accounting. The accrual 
method of accounting, as set forth in Treasury regulations, imposes tax 
"when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such 
income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable 
accuracy."97 The first prong-fixed right to receive-is not a serious 
problem. The second prong-amount determined with reasonable 
accuracy-is a problem. The ultimate amount of payment under a 
deferred compensation plan might tum on several contingencies, like 
investment performance and employee mortality. Dealing with these 
contingencies is possible,98 but policymakers should be aware that 
94 Doran, supra note 6, at 226; see also Michael Doran, Executive Compensation Reform and 
the Limits of Tax Policy (Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 18, 2004), 
available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311113. 
95 Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638, 4639 (Feb. 3, 1978) (proposing 
regulations that would immediately tax compensation deferred at an employee's election), with 
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2782 (negating the proposed 
regulations by mandating that deferred compensation be taxed according to "the principles set 
forth in regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions relating to deferred compensation which were 
in effect on February 1, 1978"). 
96 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 801, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3929-31 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 457A (West 2010)). 
97 Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-l(a)(as amended in 1999). 
98 Congress used a sledgehammer to deal with these contingencies in § 457 A. Employees 
subject to § 457A can defer tax when the amount of compensation is "not determinable," but 
must augment the ultimate tax owed with interest and a 20% additional tax. I.R.C. § 457A(c) 
(West 2010). Their approach to the Social Security and Medicare (i.e., FICA) taxes is somewhat 
more nuanced. FICA generally applies to deferred compensation at the time it is earned. See 
Treas. Reg.§ 31.312l(v)(2)-l(e)(l) (1999). However, tax is deferred if the amount deferred is 
not "reasonably ascertainable." See Treas. Reg.§ 31.312l(v)(2)-l(e)(4)(i). FICA applies only to 
the compensation (i.e., wage) component of deferred compensation. It does not apply to 
investment earnings on the amounts initially deferred. In this sense, early taxation is a good thing 
under FICA. The problem with extending the FICA approach to the income tax is that deferral 
for the income tax is typically desired by employers and employees, who would have an incentive 
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accrual method of accounting needs adjustment to handle long-term, 
contingent promises like deferred compensation.99 
There are other obstacles to accrual accounting as well. None are 
thoroughly persuasive, but they might still be raised in political 
discourse. Since payment of deferred compensation is contingent upon 
the solvency of the employer, employees might pay tax on amounts they 
never actually receive. 100 More significantly, employees receiving large 
awards of deferred compensation might face significant liquidity 
constraints. Some might fear that accrual accounting would give 
employers an excuse to pay excessive executive compensation in the 
form of "gross ups" to cover the accelerated tax bills. Finally, accrual 
taxation would lead to even more compensation being rendered 
nondeductible under limits found in§ 162(m) of the Code. 
Accrual taxation may well be ideal, and the difficulties listed above 
may well be surmountable. A thorough proposal on subjecting deferred 
compensation to accrual taxation is a worthwhile and timely task, 
especially in light of congressional efforts to subject limited forms of 
deferred compensation to accrual taxation. Nevertheless, this is a route 
not taken by this Article, which instead takes the incremental path of 
proposing a system of taxing deferred compensation that replicates the 
results of accrual taxation without triggering the practical difficulties of 
immediate taxation. 
C. Do Nothing 
In an apparent about face from a prior article, Professor Ethan Yale 
recently argued that the tax advantage of deferred compensation is 
relatively meager and that further legal reform might not be justified. 10 1 
Professor Yale's arguments are based on the "Domar-Musgrave 
theory," which essentially bifurcates investment returns into risk-free 
and risky elements. 102 Under the right assumptions, taxpayers can avoid 
to structure deferred compensation in a manner that makes the amount deferred not "reasonably 
ascertainable." 
99 Employers currently deduct deferred compensation on a cash basis, even if they otherwise 
follow the accrual method of accounting. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5). 
100 See Halperin, supra note 4, at 541-42. Of course, employer stock can also be considered 
"phantom income" that dissipates upon employer insolvency. In addition to the phantom-income 
problem, Professor Halperin is also concerned about the "income bunching" that would result 
from accrual method taxation. This Article's view is that income bunching is part and parcel of a 
progressive tax system that has no formal system for income averaging. Thus, in my prior article, 
I advocated taxing all deferred compensation payments at the highest marginal rate. 
101 See Yale, supra note 6. 
102 Cf David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX. L. REV. I, 1-2 (2004) 
("Income tax, the [Domar-Musgrave]literature argues, do not tax most returns to capital. ... The 
reason is that capital income is mostly a return to bearing risk, and individuals, even in a Haig-
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taxation of the risky element of all returns to capital. Taxpayers cannot, 
however, avoid the taxation of the risk-free element. This element, 
though, is relatively meager according to the Domar-Musgrave 
adherents, especially when one excludes the inflation of the nominal 
interest. Under Domar-Musgrave, then, deferred compensation merely 
allows employees and employers to avoid the tax on this meager risk-
free element, which is not worth protecting according to Professor Yale. 
Deferred compensation presents problems, however, for the 
Domar-Musgrave theory. The theory holds that taxpayers can avoid the 
taxation of risky returns by increasing their exposure to risk, a point 
illustrated by Professor David Weisbach with a simple wager on a coin 
flip. 103 Heads, the taxpayer wins $1 00; tails, the taxpayer loses $100. If 
the IRS imposes a 50% tax on wagers (allowing the taxpayer to deduct 
any losses), then the initial bet becomes $50 winnings for a heads and 
$50 losses for tails. Clearly, though, the taxpayer can avoid the impact 
of this tax by simply doubling her bet. In the end, the taxpayer achieves 
the $100 gain or loss, regardless of taxes. 
However, introducing counterparties complicates this analysis 
considerably. The taxpayer is gambling with someone who presumably 
has some tax consequences. Now, if the counterparty also faces a 50% 
tax rate, then taxes are truly meaningless as they produce no net revenue 
for the government. The gamble is a zero-sum game, and the tax from 
one side's winnings will be offset by the deduction from the other side's 
losses. If the counterparty faces a different rate, however, then the 
parties cannot adjust the gambling contract so that both of them avoid 
the effect of taxes. As an extreme example, suppose that one party pays 
tax of 50%, and the other is tax exempt. The 50% taxpayer will want to 
double her bet to adjust for taxes, but the tax-exempt party has no 
reason to adjust at all. In a fluid market, of course, gamblers can just 
find someone willing to gamble on coin tosses at the desired level. 
But employment relationships are not so fluid. An executive taxed 
at 50% may want to double her deferred compensation to avoid taxes, 
but a functionally tax-exempt employer will want to make no 
adjustment at all. The executive will be unlikely to abandon the firm-
specific human and financial capital she has accumulated just to find an 
employer that will make the proper adjustments. And because 
nonqualified deferred compensation is long-term with idiosyncratic 
terms (like non-compete agreements), the employee cannot turn to 
derivatives markets to adjust for the taxation of capital income. 
Moreover, the Domar-Musgrave result may not be strong enough 
to warrant abandoning the taxation of capital income from deferred 
compensation if the current income taxation of capital returns is 
Simons system, can and will, eliminate the tax on this type of return."). 
103 See id. at 8-11. 
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otherwise maintained. The Domar-Musgrave literature typically 
excludes inflation gains from taxation because they are not economic 
income, even though they clearly constitute taxable income under 
current law.I04 Once inflation gains are taxed as they are under current 
law, then the risk-free looks far more substantial. By one reckoning, the 
risk-free rate after inflation was a mere 0.5% from 1929 to 1989, but 
inflation was 3 .1 %. 1 os 
There is also an issue about the way in which the risk-free rate is 
taxed. Professor Yale views deferred compensation as being akin to a 
capital asset, taxed only upon realization. In contrast, this Article views 
deferred compensation as essentially a debt contract that should give 
rise to annual tax consequences at ordinary rates. This different 
methodology makes a significant difference in valuing the tax benefit 
that Professor Yale dismisses as being meager. For example, using an 
illustration from Professor Yale's article, the tax benefit of $100 of 
compensation deferred over ten years is $3.60 according to Professor 
Yale's method. 106 Using the same assumptions as Professor Yale but 
changing only the methodology, this Article's approach would value the 
tax benefit at $9.10.107 
This Author is sympathetic to many of Professor Yale's concerns, 
particularly his criticism of the complexity of recent reform efforts, like 
§ 409A.108 Reform can, however, result in simplification. By 
eliminating the tax benefit of deferred compensation, Congress could 
also eliminate the burdensome regulatory regime found in § 409 A of the 
Code and allow deferred compensation to be regulated by the historical 
doctrines of constructive receipt and economic benefit. 
D. Tax Payments at the Highest Marginal Tax Rate 
In a prior article, this Author argued that Congress should tax 
deferred compensation at the highest marginal rates for individuals. 
The rationale for this proposal was that deferred compensation gives 
executives an inappropriate method by which to engage in income 
104 Seeid. at31. 
lOS See id. (discussing Joseph A. Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an 
Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REv. 377, 
387-88 (1992)). 
106 See Yale, supra note 6, at 26 (describing the risk-adjusted tax benefit for ten years of 
deferral as 0.036). 
107 Professor Yale assumes an interest rate of 4%, an employee-level tax of 35%, and a 
corporate-level tax of 0%. See id. This Article assumes that the interest rate is before tax, 
implying an after-tax rate of 2.6%. The present value of the special tax proposed in this Article, 
levied on an initial deferral of$100, would be 2.6% x 10 x (35%- 0%) x $100 = $9.10. 
108 Cf Yale, supra note 6, at 27 (noting "the staggering complexity of recent legislative forays 
into this domain (most significantly recently enacted IRC § 409A)"). 
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averaging. An executive earning compensation in a high tax bracket 
(say 35%) might expect to face a lower bracket (say 28%) in retirement, 
and deferred compensation allows the executive to have the lower 
bracket apply to compensation earned in higher-bracket years. 
Allowing ad hoc income averaging to corporate executives is 
inconsistent with vertical equity (because lower paid workers typically 
cannot participate in deferred compensation) and with horizontal equity 
(because the ability to defer compensation depends on the existence and 
willingness of the employer to accommodate the employee's tax 
planning). Finally, it is inefficient because deferred compensation may 
crowd out other investments and draw resources into socially 
unproductive tax planning. In short, Congress should not tolerate ad 
hoc income averaging under the current tax system, even if a 
comprehensive system for averaging is desirable.I09 
This Article is a refinement and extension of the prior article; it 
describes deferred compensation as having two components-
compensation and investment. Current law adequately taxes the 
compensation component if the employee's tax bracket does not 
change. When the employee's tax bracket does change, current law 
fails. To remedy that failure, the prior article argued that all deferred 
compensation payments should be taxed at a single rate, namely the 
highest marginal rate for individuals. 
However, the prior article's proposal only cures the failure of 
current law to tax the compensation component; this Article addresses 
the investment component of deferred compensation as well. To keep 
the present analysis as simple as possible, the remainder of this Article 
will assume that the employee and employer do not face changing tax 
rates over time, facilitating a focus on the failure to tax the investment 
element of deferred compensation. 
Ill. HOW CURRENT LAW FAILS TOT AX THE INVESTMENT ELEMENT 
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A. Bifurcating Deferred Compensation 
This Article's model is to evaluate current law by reference to the 
compensation and investment components of deferred compensation. 
These components are identified by determining actual yet separate 
compensation and investment transactions that replicate the employee's 
cash flows from deferred compensation. The separate transactions give 
109 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1 (2005) 
(discussing income averaging and similar systems for accommodating life-cycle earnings). 
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rise to their own tax treatment, which in the aggregate provide a 
normative baseline by which to measure the taxation of deferred 
compensation. Thus, in determining whether deferred compensation is 
tax-advantaged, the question to ask is whether deferred compensation 
results in lower taxes than the equivalent compensation-investment 
combination. The following example is used to describe how deferred 
compensation can be bifurcated. 
Example 9: It is 2008, and Ray Corp. is negotiating compensation 
with a senior executive, Emily. In addition to a base level of 
compensation, Ray Corp. is willing to either (a) pay Emily additional 
compensation of $100,000 in 2009, or (b) promise to pay Emily 
$200,000 in 2019 (in lieu of the $100,000 of additional 
compensation). 
The offer of deferred compensation gives Emily a choice between 
pre-tax income of $100,000 today or $200,000 in the future. If Emily 
pays tax at the 35% rate, her after-tax choice is between $65,000 
today 110 and $130,000 in ten years. 111 Thus, deferred compensation 
gives Emily the ability to double her money, on an after-tax basis, 
within ten years. This deal is the equivalent of giving her after-tax 
interest of about 7 .2%, compounded annually . 112 
The investment component from the example is essentially debt 
that Emily has extended to Ray Corp. If this de facto debt were formal 
debt, Emily would have to pay tax on the interest that accrues, even if 
she is a cash-method taxpayer. 113 From Emily's perspective, then, her 
after-tax return of 7.2% is equivalent to a before-tax return of about 
11%.114 The before-tax interest rate of 11% is the key to dividing the 
actual deferred-compensation contract into hypothetically separate 
compensation and debt components. This is done by assuming that the 
following occurred. 
Compensation Component: Ray Corp. pays current (2009) 
compensation to Emily of $100,000, leaving Emily with $65,000 after-
tax. 
Debt Component: Emily loans the after-tax proceeds of $65,000 
back to her employer, Ray Corp., for ten years at about 11% annual 
interest. Ray Corp. pays Emily enough cash interest to cover her tax 
bill on the interest income (3.8%) and adds the remaining interest 
(7.2%) to principal. Thus, Emily receives no net cash while the loan is 
outstanding. In 2019, Ray Corp. pays Emily principal and capitalized 
110 $100,000 less 35% tax of$35,000 = $65,000. 
Ill $200,000 less 35% tax of$70,000 = $130,000. 
112 $65,000 x (I + 0.072) 10 = $130,000. A more precise estimate of the interest rate is given 
by 2 1110 - 1 = 7.177%. 
113 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
114 As always, this Article assumes that Emily pays tax at the 35% rate. Using the more 
precise estimate from note 112, the equivalent pre-tax rate is (2 1110 - 1) I 0.65 = 11.042%. 
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interest of $130,000. 
From Emily's perspective, these two transactions are economically 
equivalent to the deferred-compensation transaction, because both yield 
after-tax cash of$130,000 in 2019. 
As argued above, the tax treatment of the bifurcated transaction 
should be the normative baseline in judging whether current law 
properly taxes deferred compensation. 115 Thus, it is possible to judge 
the adequacy of current law by comparing how the IRS fares with 
deferred compensation versus the bifurcated transaction. Ideally, the 
IRS's net claim should be the same from the two economically 
equivalent transactions. The next two subparts will show that current 
law adequately taxes the wage component of deferred compensation, 
but fails to tax the debt component at all. 
B. The Compensation Element of Deferred Compensation 
Returning to Example 9 above, this Article will now specify Ray 
Corp.'s tax rate. 
Example I 0: It is 2008, and Ray Corp. is negotiating compensation 
with a senior executive, Emily. Ray Corp. will pay Emily additional 
compensation of $100,000 in 2009, or promise to pay Emily 
$200,000 in 2019 (in lieu of the $100,000 of additional 
compensation). The parties choose the deferred compensation. 
Emily faces a marginal tax rate of 35%, but Ray Corp. faces a rate of 
only 20%. 
Because of the difference in tax rates, payments from Ray Corp. to 
Emily result in net revenue to the IRS. Ray Corp. gets a deduction 
worth twenty cents for every dollar paid, but Emily must pay tax of 
thirty-five cents for every dollar received. On a net basis, then, the IRS 
gets fifteen cents of every dollar paid. 
So, if there was no deferral, and Ray Corp. paid Emily $100,000 in 
2009, the IRS would get an immediate claim of$15,000. If instead Ray 
Corp. and Emily deferred the 2009 compensation, the IRS's claim 
would be $30,000 (i.e., 15% of $200,000) in 2019. Just like Emily, the 
IRS sees its money double from 2009 to 2019. The IRS is "due" 
$15,000 in 2009, but it gets $30,000 in 2019 if the compensation is 
deferred. 
115 See infra Part III .A. 
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After-Tax Consequences of Current 2009 Compensation 
Emily Ray Corp. IRS 
2009 Compensation $100,000 ($100,000) 
2009 Tax ($35,000) $35,000 
2009 Deduction $20,000 ($20,000) 
2009 Net $65,000 ($80,000) $15,000 
After-Tax Consequences of Deferred 2019 Compensation 
Emily Ray Corp. IRS 
2019 Compensation $200,000 ($200,000) 
2019 Tax ($70,000) $70,000 
2019 Deduction $40,000 ($40,000) 
2019 Net $130,000 ($160,000) $30,000 
Because the IRS gets the same deal as Emily, it is given the full 
value of its claim to the compensation element of deferred 
compensation. Implicit in this assertion is the unorthodox step of 
measuring the IRS's time-value-of-money claim using an after-tax rate 
of return agreed to by private parties. Ordinarily, the IRS pays and 
receives interest according to rates set by statute. 116 As a normative 
matter, however, an arms-length rate set by private parties is a superior 
measure. Indeed, the market rate of return implied by Emily and Ray 
Corp.'s contract should reflect the risks that Ray Corp. will not pay 
Emily in 2019, in which case the IRS (like Emily) will receive nothing 
from its compensation claim. In short, the IRS is deferring its 
compensation claim on the same terms as Emily, making it entitled to 
the same after-tax return that Emily receives. 
Even if the IRS's claim is valued according to the return agreed 
upon by Emily and Ray Corp., using the after-tax return of 7.2% might 
seem inappropriate. Why should the IRS be limited to the after-tax 
return when it is functionally tax exempt? The answer lies in the fact 
that the IRS would bear an implicit "tax" if it were actually in the 
business of lending money. Recall that the IRS is deferring its 2009 
116 See I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6611, 6621 (West 2010) (describing interest paid and received by the 
IRS on overpayment and underpayment of taxes); see also Rev. Rul. 2008-10, 2008-13 I.R.B. 676 
(announcing rates for second quarter of2008). 
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claim of $15,000 to 2019. Now, if Emily could borrow $15,000 from 
the IRS for ten years to finance her debt investment in Ray Corp., she 
would presumably be entitled to an interest deduction. 117 Were Emily 
to pay deductible interest of 11% to the IRS, the IRS would keep only 
7.2% on a net basis, because Emily would take a deduction that reduces 
her net interest expense from 11% to 7.2%. 11 8 The difference of 3.8% 
burdens the IRS because it reduces other revenue the IRS would receive 
from Emily. 11 9 Thus, the after-tax return earned by Emily of7.2% is the 
appropriate rate of interest to measure the IRS's compensation claim. 
Under this analysis, then, the IRS does in fact get its proper share 
of the compensation element of deferred compensation. Ideally, the 
IRS would receive its claim to the compensation element upon initial 
deferral (2009 in the example). Instead, the IRS gets an equivalent 
amount when deferred compensation is actually paid (20 19 in the 
example). Although there may be other plausible approaches to valuing 
the compensation element, the one given above has the advantage of 
simplicity. In fact, it is not even necessary to identify the actual after-
tax interest rate used by Emily and Ray Corp. or the amount of 2009 
compensation deferred. That rate is implied by the deal struck by the 
private parties, and the IRS will always be made whole at the time of 
ultimate payment. 120 All that is needed is to ensure that the payment of 
deferred compensation is taxed as it is under current law. 
C. The Investment Element of Deferred Compensation 
Recall that the normative baseline for taxing deferred 
compensation is based on what the IRS would receive if the parties 
structured their transaction as an equivalent combination of current 
compensation followed by a debt (investment) transaction. As 
discussed, current law gives the IRS its claim to the compensation 
element of deferred compensation, but does not go any farther. Thus, it 
fails to give the IRS any claim at all to the investment element, which is 
inherently valuable. To see what the IRS loses under current law, 
117 In this case, this Article assumes that Emily has borrowed these funds in order to make her 
investment in Ray Corp. If that is the case, the interest is deductible as investment interest. See 
I.R.C. § 163( d)(3)(A). 
118 II% less the 35% tax is 7.2%. 
119 It is possible to establish the appropriateness of using the 7.2% rate through another 
method. Ray Corp.'s equivalent before-tax rate is 9.0% because 9.0% less 20% is 7.2%. Were 
the IRS to pay taxable interest of 9.0% to Ray Corp., the IRS would face a net payment of only 
7.2%. Because the 9.0% interest is taxable to Ray Corp, 20% of the payment goes to the IRS as 
tax revenue. 
120 The IRS does lose, however, if the employee's tax rate falls after the initial deferral. Cf 
Chason, supra note 6. 
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consider again the example of deferred compensation and the 
economically equivalent transactions, which produce the same cash 
flows and economic risks for Emily as does deferred compensation. 
Because Emily is indifferent between deferred compensation and the 
equivalent transactions, any additional taxes from the equivalent 
transaction are borne by Ray Corp. That is consistent with the ultimate 
proposal of this Article to levy a special tax on the employer only. 121 
Recall that in Example 10, deferred compensation offers Emily a 
$200,000 payment in 2019 in lieu of a $100,000 payment in 2009. 
Assuming that Ray Corp. pays tax at a 20% rate and Emily at 35%, the 
investment (debt element) can be determined by the following 
economically equivalent transactions: 
Example 11: The following transactions are, from Emily's 
perspective, economically equivalent to the deferred compensation 
described in Example I 0: 
Compensation Element: Ray Corp. pays Emily $100,000 in 
compensation. After tax, Emily keeps $65,000. 
Investment (Debt) Element: Emily loans $65,000 back to Ray Corp. 
at a taxable rate of about II%, for a period of ten years. After tax, 
this 11% rate is 7.2%; that doubles Emily's money in ten years and 
she receives $130,000 in 2019. This amount is what Emily would 
have netted had she received a taxable $200,000 payment of deferred 
compensation in 2019. 
As discussed above, current law gives the IRS its proper share of 
the compensation element. Even though the IRS must wait to receive 
its share until 2019, it is adequately compensated. The IRS's other 
claim is to the debt component of the equivalent transaction, and the 
IRS receives nothing for this claim under current law. The following 
chart describes what the IRS should be receiving. Its right-hand column 
of shows the cash flows to the IRS from the investment (debt) element 
in Example 11: 
121 See infra Part IV.B. 
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Table 1 
Loan Pretax Emily's Balance Interest Taxon (grows at (-11%)I23 Interest 
-7.2%)122 (35%) 
$65,000 $7,177 $2,512 
69,665 7,692 2,692 
74,665 8,245 2,886 
80,024 8,836 3,093 
85,768 9,471 3,315 
91,924 10,150 3,553 
98,522 10,879 3,808 
105,593 11,660 4,081 
113,172 12,496 4,374 
















Thus, the debt component of the equivalent transaction produces a 
series of positive, net claims for the IRS from 2009 through 2018. The 
IRS should be receiving these periodic amounts (or their lump-sum 
equivalent), regardless of whether the private parties structure their deal 
as deferred compensation or the equivalent compensation/debt 
combination. Because current law gives the IRS only its claim to the 
compensation component, it essentially negates the IRS's claim to the 
debt or investment component of deferred compensation. 
Note that the tax advantage of deferred compensation turns on the 
difference in the parties' tax rates, precisely because it is this difference 
that gives value to the IRS's claim to interest. If the employer and 
employee have the same tax rate, there is no advantage to deferred 
compensation, as interest passing between two equivalent-rate taxpayers 
produces no revenue for the IRS. If the employer has a lower rate, 
however, deferred compensation is advantageous because the benefit to 
the employee (tax-exempt interest) outweighs the burden to the 
122 Each period the loan balance increases by the after-tax interest rate. In the text, this is 
described as 7.2%, but a more precise estimate that will replicate the numbers in the charts is 
7.177%. Seesupranote 112. 
123 A more precise estimate of the interest rate that will replicate the numbers in the chart is 
11.042%. See supra note 114. 
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employer (foregone interest deduction). In essence, deferred 
compensation allows the employer to give tax-exempt interest to the 
employee, so long as the employer forgoes its own interest deduction. 
This result is consistent with other works that have viewed 
deferred compensation as an investment conduit by which low-tax 
corporations invest on behalf of high-tax employees. 124 The tax benefit 
is proportionate to the difference in tax rates between the parties. That 
being said, there are two advantages to the current approach. The first 
advantage is theoretical, in that it does not depend on the existence of a 
rabbi trust or other funding. Deferred compensation implies an 
investment contract between employer and employee. This contract-
not any actual or hypothetical funding-is what should be taxed. The 
second advantage is pragmatic in that it allows for the development of a 
special tax levied on the payment of deferred compensation. As 
suggested earlier, the failure of current law to tax the interest 
component of deferred compensation creates unjustifiable tax planning 
opportunities. 125 Remedying this failure is the goal of this Article. 
IV. APPLYING A SPECIAL TAX UPON PAYMENT 
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
A Goals of the Special Tax 
Any proposal to cure the failures of current law must be 
administrable as applied to a wide range of taxpayers and deferred 
compensation arrangements. Moreover, any proposal should give 
employers and employees maximum freedom in structuring their 
economic deals. Thus, Congress should neither attempt to outlaw 
deferred compensation nor encourage it. Instead, Congress should tax 
deferred compensation according to the compensation and investment 
components that replicate the cash flows the employee receives from 
deferred compensation. Using simple debt as a prototypical investment 
transaction, Part III of this Article demonstrated how current law fails to 
tax the investment component and reiterated the call made by other 
scholars to impose a special tax on deferred compensation. 
Debt is the motivating example in the development of the special 
tax, but this Article will extend the debt model to a variety of deferred 
compensation plans that do not have debt as their investment 
component. 126 For now, though, the task is to develop a special tax that 
124 See supra Part II.A. 
125 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra Part III.B. 
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gives the IRS its appropriate claim to the interest that passes from 
employer to employee in a debt-based deferred compensation plan. 
This tax is a special tax on the employer, levied at the time of 
actual payment, which equals revenue that the IRS should receive from 
the interest inherent in deferred-compensation contract. There are two 
design constraints on this special tax: ( 1) that it be imposed on the 
employer only, and (2) that it be imposed at the time when actual 
payment is made under the deferred compensation contract. These 
considerations are explained in more detail as follows. 
B. Taxing the Employer Only 
Taxing the employer is justified because the employer is almost 
certainly in a better administrative position to calculate and pay the tax 
than are individual employees. Moreover, the goal of most deferred 
compensation arrangements is to prevent employees from facing any tax 
consequences before the time of final payment. Levying the special tax 
on the employee would probably prompt employers to provide 
additional compensation to the employee to cover the extra tax bill. So, 
levying the special tax on the employer is consistent with the goals of 
the private parties and allows them to avoid the unnecessary expense of 
contractually shifting the incidence of the tax to the employer. There is 
nothing wrong with facilitating this goal, so long as the IRS's net claim 
is not affected. 
The employer's role is not limited to being a tax proxy or 
withholding agent for the employee. The employer is also the actual 
debtor, accruing an interest expense under the deferred compensation 
contract. Current law does not allow an interest deduction, precisely 
because the interest income is not taxable to the employee.I 27 If interest 
income becomes taxable, then the employer's interest expense should 
be deductible. 
The employer's two roles (proxy for the employee and debtor) 
dictate the tax rate to be applied for the special tax. Deferred 
compensation is concentrated almost entirely on highly paid 
employees. 128 Under the reasonable assumption that all beneficiaries of 
127 See Albertson's, Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. 415 (1990) (holding for Commissioner), ajf'd, 42 
F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994). 
128 A. THOMAS 8RJSENDINE ET AL., TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 385-4TH: DEFERRED 
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS § DCA. ("Strange as it may seem at first glance, unfunded 
deferred compensation plans for rank-and-file employees are illegal, even where the employer's 
intention is to confer a benefit that it would not otherwise provide."). Deferred compensation, 
being an unfunded ERISA retirement plan, can be established only for "a select group of 
management or highly compensated employees." Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), § 30l(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (2006). So-called excess benefit plans under 
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deferred compensation are executives paying the top marginal rate, the 
top rate applies when taxing the employer as proxy for the employee. 
Since the employer is the actual debtor, it should simply take an 
income-tax deduction for the interest expense it incurs. So if the 
employer also faces the top marginal rate, the two components will 
offset one another. This is as it should be, because the IRS ordinarily 
has no claim to interest passing from taxpayers at the same marginal 
rate. As the employer's tax rate falls, the IRS's debt claim will grow 
larger. At the extreme, the IRS's debt claim is worth a full 35% of 
interest paid if the employer is tax exempt. 
C. Taxing Deferred Compensation Only upon Payment 
The proposed special tax has another design constraint-it is levied 
only when the employer makes an actual payment to the employee. 
This timing rule is inconsistent with the usual taxation of debt, which is 
subject to annual taxation as interest passes between the parties. 129 One 
rationale for imposing the tax on the back end is to avoid taxpayer 
resistance against paying tax on "phantom" income. Another is that it 
avoids difficult issues that would arise if the employer defaulted on its 
deferred compensation obligation. Had the employer taken periodic 
interest deductions, it would arguably have cancellation of indebtedness 
income upon default. Conversely, the employee (or the employer, as 
proxy) could conceivably claim a loss deduction after paying tax on the 
interest. 
Perhaps most importantly, a back-end tax avoids the cumbersome 
task of periodically valuing the deferred compensation obligation. An 
annual, periodic tax would require that a value be placed on the promise 
starting at the time of initial deferral. Yet the value of the initial 
promise may be difficult to discern, particularly if the contract is not 
structured as debt. Deferred compensation is often structured to give 
employees a payout that is dependent upon the employer's profitability 
or the performance of external investments (like a stock market index). 
The ultimate payment in deferred compensation is known, because that 
is what the Code currently taxes. Even if structured as debt, deferred 
compensation plans may not have clear values before the time of actual 
payment. The parties simply might not oblige the IRS with the initial 
ERISA § 3(36) can be offered outside this "select group," but they are quite narrow and rare in 
practice. See BRISENDINE, supra, § DCA. (noting that excess benefit plans are not a common 
refuge from the requirements of ERISA); id. §II. G. ("An excess benefit plan must be maintained 
'solely' for the purpose of providing benefits in excess of the [IRC] § 415 limits and the 
limitation will, in all likelihood, be construed narrowly."). 
129 See supra notes 67-68 (discussing original-issue discount). 
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value of the contract as Emily and Ray Corp. have done in the 
examples. For example, an employer might promise to pay $200,000 in 
2019 without declaring the 2009 value of the promise. A back-end tax, 
as proposed here, can be levied in 2019 based on the $200,000 payment 
without knowing the initial value of the promise.t3o 
Because the special tax applies only upon ultimate payment of 
deferred compensation, it must be levied on the future value of the 
investment component that is implicit in the deferred compensation 
contract. This Article will term this future value the "lump-sum 
interest," as interest-bearing debt is the motivating example for the 
special tax. Ordinarily, interest is taxed as it accrues, but the special tax 
will wait until completion of the contract. The employer would pay a 
nondeductible tax on the lump-sum interest at the highest rate for 
individuals (currently 35%). The assumption that all employees 
accruing deferred compensation are taxed at the 35% rate is close to 
reality,13 1 and is necessary to administer a special tax on payment to the 
employee. The 35% tax on the lump-sum interest amount reflects the 
value of the tax that should have been collected from the employee over 
the course of the deferred-compensation contract. The employer pays 
this tax as proxy for the employee. 
At the same time it pays this tax, the employer can take a 
deduction for the lump-sum interest. This amount reflects the future 
value of the deductions that the employer should have been taking over 
the course of the contract. Ideally, the employer would have been 
deducting interest throughout the life of the contract, and the lump-sum 
deduction at the end may yield different results because the employer's 
tax rate may vary from year to year. Corporations do, however, have 
substantial (although imperfect) income averaging through the use of 
net operating losses, 132 which stabilize the marginal tax rate-measured 
in economic terms-that corporations pay. Also, it is likely that 
employers have fairly stable annual expenses related to deferred 
compensation, suggesting that the actual interest incurred under 
deferred compensation is close to the lump-sum interest deducted under 
the special tax proposal. In summary, and as with the assumption that 
all beneficiaries of deferred compensation pay a tax of 35% tax, 
granting the interest deduction in the year of actual payment does not 
perfectly capture the results from taxing annual interest. Yet it is a 
close approximation that achieves an administrable result. 
130 See supra Part III.A. 
131 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
132 Cf Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REv. 745, 
768-69 (2007). 
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D. Calculating Lump-Sum Interest 
In order to calculate the lump-sum interest, it is first necessary to 
identify the periodic interest that should be subject to tax. Example 11 
above describes the periodic interest passing from Ray Corp. to Emily, 
but it is important to describe this interest in more conceptual terms. As 
a practical matter, it is possible to identify the periodic interest by the 
after-tax interest rate implied by the parties' transaction and the before-
tax amount of compensation deferred. 133 In the prior example, the 
before-tax interest rate implied by the parties was about 7 .2%, and the 
before-tax deferral was $100,000. Thus, about $7200 of interest should 
be taxed by the IRS in the first year of deferral (2009), as confirmed in 
Example 11. 
Because interest is being capitalized, the amount of interest grows 
every year; the growth rate is the same as the interest rate, or 7 .2%. 
Thus, in the second year of deferral (20 1 0), about $7700 in interest is 
incurred, and subsequent years' interest has the same growth rate. The 
chart in Table 1 confirms the accuracy of these estimates. Thus, the 
IRS's claim can be described as a growing annuity that starts at $7200, 
133 Conceptually, this approach commits two wrongs that do make a right. The IRS's debt 
claim is based on the before-tax interest rate implied by the private parties ' transaction and the 
after-tax amount of compensation deferred. The reason for using the before-tax rate of interest 
should be obvious, as the Code imposes tax on, and often allows deductions for, private-party 
interest. Using the numbers from the example, the before-tax interest rate is about ll% ("grossed 
up" from 7.2%). The reason for using this before-tax rate is a bit cumbersome because the 
interest rate implied by the transaction is an after-tax return, but the special tax should be based 
on a before-tax return. Theoretically, then, the special tax works only if the implicit interest is 
appropriately "grossed up." 
Recall that in the example, Ray Corp. is providing an after-tax return of about 7.2%, which 
doubles Emily's money over ten years. If the goal is to give an employee a 7.2% after-tax return, 
then the tax cannot be based on interest of 7 .2%. Instead, it is necessary to increase the taxable 
interest rate to II%; after the imposition of a 35% tax on interest of II%, the employee is left 
with 7.2%. In essence, the special tax proposed in this Article would allow the employee to keep 
the 7.2% of interest "tax free," but force the employer to pay tax on the grossed up (II%) interest 
as the employee's proxy or withholding agent. This yields precisely the same result for the IRS 
as if Emily herself were personally taxed on interest of II%. Emily keeps 7.2% as capitalized 
interest, and the remaining 3.8% represents a claim held by the IRS. 
Fortunately, it is not necessary to gross up the interest rates directly when calculating the 
special tax. Recall in the example that deferred compensation is bifurcated into a wage and debt 
transaction, using Emily's 35% marginal tax rate in both transactions. In the wage transaction, it 
was assumed that Ray Corp. paid her $100,000, but that Emily paid $35,000 of cash. So, Emily 
loans $65,000 to Ray Corp. in the debt transaction, in which the before-tax rate of 7.2% was 
grossed up to 11%. In short, the special tax on after-tax compensation ($65,000) and before-tax 
interest (II%) is conceptually based. It is possible to equivalently base the special tax on before-
tax compensation ($100,000) and after-tax interest (7.2%). Either method produces the same 
amount of taxable interest. The second method is more administrable, however, as it allows for 
the calculation of the amount of taxable interest implied by the deferred compensation contract 
without knowing the employee's marginal tax rate. 
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and is subject to a growth and interest rate of7.2%, lasting for ten years. 
With this conceptual description of the interest rate, it is possible to use 
a future-value formula to find the 2019 value of these interest payments, 
which is about $135,000. 134 Calculations relying on future-value 
formulas may be too unwieldy. For that reason, discussion of the 
formulas is left to the Appendix, while this Article proposes that the 
lump-sum interest be calculated in the following-hopefully more 
intuitive-manner. 
Interest Rate: The mechanics of determining the lump-sum interest 
rate become simpler if the interest rate is adjusted slightly. In the 
example, before-tax interest rate implied by the private parties is about 
7 .2%, using annual compounding. 135 A continuously compounded 
interest rate allows for a simpler calculation. In Example 12, the 
equivalent continuously compounded interest rate is 6.9%.136 
Lump-Sum Interest: With the change to a continuously 
compounded interest rate, it is possible to drop the future-value 
formulas and value the lump-sum interest through an equivalent yet 
more intuitive process. Under this process, the lump-sum interest 
equals the product of: 
the final pre-tax payment ($200,000), 
the continuously compounded interest rate (6.9%), and 
the number of years that the deferred compensation contract was 
outstanding (10 years). 
These steps look remarkably like the way one computes simple, 
uncompounded interest. Yet it produces essentially the same result as 
the more sophisticated future-value formula. In the example, this yields 
a lump-sum interest of $200,000 x 6.9% x 10 = $138,000, roughly the 
same result derived above. 137 The difference is due to the switch from 
annual to continuous compounding. 
The remaining steps are straightforward. The employer deducts 
the lump-sum interest in the year of payment, but must pay a 
nondeductible special tax on the lump-sum interest at the same time. In 
134 The future value of a growing annuity is A x n x (l+i)"-1, where A is the initial annuity, n 
is the number of years, and i is the interest (and growth) rate. See Wikipedia, Time 
Value of Money, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_ value_of_money#Future_ value_of_a_ 
growing_annuity (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) ("Where i = g"). So, the future value is $7200 x 10 
X (1.072)10"1 = $134,613. 
135 Careful readers may detect an apparent inconsistency. Earlier, this Article proposed that 
the special tax should be based on the before-tax rate of interest, whereas here this Article bases 
the calculation on the after-tax rate of interest. This is true, although Step Two compensates for 
this by assuming that the implied loan is of the before-tax amount of $200,000. These two 
"wrongs" essentially cancel each other out, and allow for simpler computational steps. Readers 
who desire a more rigorous explanation should consult the Appendix. 
136 Recall that a 7.2% rate doubles money over ten years with annual compounding. A 6.9% 
rate does the same with continuous compounding as e10 ' 0·069 = 2. A more precise estimate is 
ln(2) I lO = 6.9315. 
137 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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the example, Ray Corp. gets a 2019 deduction worth $138,000 x 20% = 
$27,600, but must pay a 2019 special tax of$138,000 x 35% = $48,300. 
The net claim of the IRS is the difference between the two, which is 
$20,700 in the example.l38 
Note that the special-tax regime will not always produce revenue 
for the IRS. If the employer pays tax at the 35% tax rate, the value of 
its deduction will precisely offset the cost of the special tax. Earlier in 
this Article, it was shown that differences in the tax rates between 
employer and employee create a tax advantage for deferred 
compensation. The special tax proposed in this Article curtails that 
advantage, without burdening further deferred compensation. 
V. APPLYING THE SPECIAL TAX TO DIVERSE DEFERRED 
COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS 
The previous Part proposed a special tax that would apply to a 
simple, debt-based, deferred-compensation arrangement. Such simple 
arrangements are found in practice, but so too are others not easily 
classified as straight debt. The goal of this Part is to extend the special 
tax to the fullest possible array of deferred compensation arrangements 
used in practice. 
A Statutory Versus Contractual Interest Rates 
In the prior example, the actual contractual rate of interest was 
used to calculate the lump-sum interest amount. Determining the actual 
contract rate of interest may not always be feasible. For example, the 
deferred compensation may be expressed simply as a promise to pay an 
amount in the future (e.g., $200,000 in 2019). It is not possible to 
extrapolate the implied interest rate without knowing the equivalent 
amount of current compensation (e.g., $100,000 in 2009). 
Moreover, the private parties cannot be expected to provide 
reliable information about the equivalent amount of current 
compensation. Because the special tax depends on the interest rate, the 
parties would have an incentive to manipulate any information they 
provide in order to depress the interest rate implicit in deferred 
compensation. 
Example 12: Emily and Ray Corp. purport that Emily is deferring 
$180,000 in 2009 in exchange for a payment of $200,000 in 2019. 
138 $48,300- $27,600. 
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The interest rate implied by the parties' contract is about I%. 139 
If the form of Emily and Ray Corp.'s contract were respected, the 
special tax would result in a net tax cost to Ray Corp. of $3000. 140 In 
contrast, Example 11 assumed a $200,000 payment in 2019 but a 6.9% 
interest rate. This higher interest rate resulted in a net tax on Ray Corp. 
of $27,000. 141 The variance comes from the fact that the special tax is 
directly proportionate to the assumed interest rate. 
Another difficulty would arise from contractual rates that vary over 
time despite very good information about the initial value of the 
deferred compensation. A common deferred compensation arrangement 
has the employee electively defer salary or bonus payments, and the 
employer would then credit the deferred compensation to a notional 
account, which would be periodically adjusted for interest credits. Yet 
the interest credits might not be fixed, being based instead on an 
adjustable rate like the prime interest rate or LIBOR. 142 Taxing the 
exact amount of interest would require the employer and the IRS to 
track interest as it fluctuates, a task tantamount to imposing the tax on a 
periodic basis. Indeed, a periodic tax may work well when an employer 
sets aside an identifiable account for an employee and credits it with a 
reasonable rate of interest. In other contexts, however, a periodic tax 
will not work so well. 143 For the sake of uniformity, this Article's 
proposal would subject all deferred compensation plans to the special 
tax only upon actual payment, rather than periodically. 
To avoid the difficulty of varying interest rates or employer 
manipulation, the special tax should be based on a statutory rate of 
interest. The Internal Revenue Code commonly uses statutory rates in 
imputing interest to transactions, with perhaps the closest parallel being 
the taxation of loans between employer and employee bearing below-
market interest. 144 The solution of§ 7872 is to impute interest to below-
market loans at a statutorily prescribed, "applicable Federal rate,"145 or 
AFR. For example, the long-term AFR for December 2008 is 4.45%,146 
implying an after-tax interest rate of about 2.9%. 147 There are potential 
139 A closer estimate is 1.06% as $180,000 x 1.010610 = $200,000. 
140 The lump-sum interest is I% x I 0 x $200,000 = $20,000. The 35% proxy tax would be 
$7000. The deduction, assuming a 20% rate, would be worth $4000. The difference between the 
two, $3000, is the IRS's net claim. 
141 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
142 LIBOR is the London Interbank Offer Rate and is a short-term rate used by banks 
borrowing from one another and to value derivative contracts. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 40, 
at 551. 
143 See supra Part li.A. 
144 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(I)(B) (West 2010). 
145 l.R.C. § 7872(f)(2). 
146 See Rev. Rut. 2008-53, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1231. 
147 The 4.45% rate is reduced by 35% to arrive at the equivalent after-tax rate. The AFR 
represents a before-tax interest rate because the interest imputed by § 7872 is includible to the 
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objections to using a discount AFR in calculating the special tax in light 
of the nature of deferred compensation and common employer 
practices. 
One reason that AFR may not be appropriate for levying the 
special tax is that it is based on the cost of borrowing to the United 
States government. 148 Deferred compensation is long-term corporate, 
not government, borrowing, and is analogous to a bond or debenture. 
Investment-grade corporate bonds carry a higher rate of interest than 
U.S. government debt, reflecting their lower liquidity and higher risk of 
default. 149 The Code already uses corporate-bond yields to determine 
funding levels for qualified retirement plans, 150 and those yields could 
serve as the basis for the special tax. By way of comparison to the 
4.45% AFR noted above, the "composite corporate bond rate" for 
November 2008 was 7.72%.151 
The interest rate used above was the after-tax return implied by the 
deferred compensation plan. Presumably, then, the statutory rate for 
levying the special tax should similarly be reduced to an after-tax rate. 
After all, the yield on corporate bonds is taxed as ordinary income. Yet 
deferred compensation often bears rates of return above what could be 
achieved in the market. The method of granting above-market returns 
can be express, such as when firms promise interest rates that are 
objectively higher than any market index, 152 or when employers offer 
investment returns that replicate the tax-exempt returns of their 40l(k) 
plans. 153 In short, employers frequently augment the investment return 
on deferred compensation, providing after-tax returns that are the same 
or higher than market-based before-tax returns. 
One might argue that the augmented return is actually "camouflage 
compensation"154 and thus not appropriately taxed as interest. 
However, the camouflage compensation is being structured as interest 
in this example, making it appropriate to tax it as such. Moreover, the 
additional return may well be a default premium that the employee 
enjoys. A cornerstone of deferred compensation, the economic benefit 
lender and potentially deductible by the borrower. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 17, ~ 
55.3.2 ("The lender has gross interest income equal to the forgone interest, and the borrower has 
an interest deduction in like amount if all of the limitations on deductions for interest are 
satisfied."). 
148 See I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(C). 
149 See BODlE ET AL., supra note 40,477, 496. 
150 See I.R.C. § 430(h)(2)(C). 
151 See I.R.S. Notice 2008-112, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1301. 
152 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 102 (2004). 
153 See CLARK CONSULTING, EXECUTNE BENEFITS: SURVEY OF CURRENT TRENDS 14 
(2007), http://www.clarkconsulting.com/resource/surveys/ebsurvey/pdfs/2007 _benefit_survey _ 
results. pdf. 
154 Cf BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 152 (arguing that deferred compensation is a method of 
camouflaging excess compensation of executives). 
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doctrine provides that the employee must bear the risk of default if the 
employer becomes insolvent or bankrupt, even if the employer sets 
aside funds for the employee.l 55 Similarly, the fact that deferred 
compensation is illiquid may also justify premiums above market rates. 
Thus, this Article would tentatively propose using a long-term, before-
tax market rate of interest to calculate the special tax, while recognizing 
the need for greater study into common employer practices. 
B. Phantom Stock and Other Non-Debt Deferred Compensation 
Up to this point, this Article has assumed that the investment 
component of deferred compensation is functionally debt. However, the 
investment component of deferred compensation is often structured to 
replicate an equity investment, such as employer stock. Part V.B. will 
extend the special-tax analysis to non-debt deferred compensation, 
arguing that the special proposed above can be applied to equity-based 
arrangements without modification. 
If the investment component is in employer equity, the 
arrangement is known as "phantom stock," which replicates the benefits 
of outright ownership of employer equity. 156 For example, an employer 
might promise to pay an employee the value of a thousand shares of 
employer stock, ten years after the initial promise. Note that the 
employee does not actually own the stock, nor does she have the right to 
acquire any actual stock. The employer has simply made an unfunded 
promise to pay a future amount, determined by reference to the value of 
its stock at the time of payment. 
Example 13: In 2009, Ray Corp. promises to pay Emily the value of 
10,000 shares of its common stock in 2019. In 2009, Ray Corp.'s 
stock is worth $100 per share, and in 20 19 it is worth $400 per share. 
Ray Corp. has not delivered any shares (i.e., property) to Emily in 
this example. Under the doctrines of constructive receipt and economic 
benefit, it has made an unfunded promise to pay in the future, resulting 
in no tax consequences until 2019. At that time, Emily will receive a 
$4,000,000 pretax payment, leaving her with $2,600,000 if she is a 35% 
taxpayer. At the same time, Ray Corp. will pay $4,000,000 pretax, 
costing it a net $3,200,000 if it is a 20% taxpayer. 
Previously in this Article, the special tax was developed with the 
assumption that deferred compensation contains a debt component. 
155 See supra note 18 (describing the economic benefit doctrine, which subjects employees to 
immediate taxation when they no longer face a risk of employer default). 
156 See BRISENDINE ET AL., supra note 128, at IJ.E ("A phantom stock plan is yet another form 
of incentive compensation, under which an employee is awarded the right to receive a fixed 
payment equal to the value of a specified number of shares of employer stock."). 
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Remedying the failure of current Jaw to tax this debt component was the 
goal of the special tax. Now, however, it is necessary to address a 
deferred compensation arrangement that contains an equity-not debt-
component. Fortunately, a good argument can be made to apply the 
special tax in an essentially unaltered form even when the investment 
component is not structured as debt. At an intuitive level, a uniform 
approach seems not only fair but also easily administrable, removing the 
problematic debt/equity distinctions from the world of deferred 
compensation. 
More formally, it is possible to think of phantom stock as having a 
variable payment but otherwise being "debt like." Phantom stock is not 
actual ownership of equity, but instead a promise by the employer to 
pay an amount in the future. Unlike ordinary debt, however, the 
ultimate payment is not a fixed amount based on interest rates. Instead, 
it is based on the performance of the employer's stock. 
Indeed, financial and tax theory both support the idea of treating 
fixed and variable payments equally. The taxation-of-risk literature 
demonstrates that the tax burden on risky investments is the same as 
that on risk-free investments. 157 Similarly, the method for pricing 
forward contracts from financial economics assumes that risky and risk-
free payoffs have equivalent value. 158 Since the risky payoff of 
phantom stock is equivalent to the fixed payoff of ordinary deferred 
compensation, it is appropriate to use the special-tax model developed 
above to tax phantom stock.l59 
However, these theories do have real-world limitations. For 
example, the taxation-of-risk literature assumes that a single, flat rate of 
tax applies to all risky investments, and that all loses are fully usable at 
that rate. 160 In contrast, the Internal Revenue Code has multiple rates 161 
and does not allow for full usability of losses. 162 These real-world 
limitations are almost wholly unfriendly to taxpayers when compared 
with the idealized world of theory. 163 Accounting for these limitations 
in the special tax would, however, be infeasible from an administrative 
perspective.164 A practical special tax, based on these theoretical 
157 This is the "Domar-Musgrave" theory, summarized by Charlene D. Luke, Taxing Risk: An 
Approach to Variable Insurance Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 295-303 (2007). 
158 See HULL, supra note 71, at 103-04. 
159 This point is made in somewhat more detail infra Appendix, Part II. 
160 See Luke, supra note !57, at 295-303. 
161 See I.R.C. § !(h) (describing several rates applicable to capital gains) (West 2010). 
162 See I.R.C. § 1211. 
163 One taxpayer-fiiendly intrusion from the real world is the step up in basis that applies to 
inherited property. See I.R.C. § 1014. The step up does not apply to phantom stock and other 
deferred compensation because it is income in respect of a decedent. See I.R.C. § 1014(c). 
164 Phantom stock can be re-characterized as ordinary deferred compensation combined with a 
forward contract to purchase the stock. Cf Yale & Polsky, supra note 6, at 616 (equating 
phantom stock plans with a combination of current compensation, debt, and forward contract). 
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models, may well under-tax the investment component of phantom 
stock, as it will not account for these taxpayer-unfriendly elements of 
the Code. However, the Code does not currently tax the investment 
component at all. While the special tax proposed here may not fully tax 
the investment component of phantom stock, it does not result in over-
taxation and is an improvement over current law. 
The mechanics of applying the special tax to phantom stock are the 
same as before. It is first necessary to identify the appropriate interest 
rate. In prior examples, a rate of 6.9%, compounded continuously, was 
used. Next, the product of the interest rate (6.9%), the duration of the 
contract (ten years), and the final value of the contract ($4,000,000) 
arrives at a lump-sum interest amount of $2,760,000. 165 Ray Corp. then 
pays a special tax on the lump-sum interest at the highest marginal rate. 
At a 35% rate, the tax is $966,000. Ray Corp. then deducts the lump-
sum interest. If Ray Corp. is at the 20% rate, the deduction is worth 
$552,000. On a net basis, Ray Corp. must pay $414,000 of extra tax to 
the IRS. 
C. Measuring the Duration of Deferred-Compensation Contracts 
The proposed special tax turns on three inputs: an interest rate, the 
amount actually paid to the employee, and the duration of the contract. 
This Article has already studied the first two inputs, 166 but it has taken 
the duration of the contract for granted in prior examples. However, the 
duration of the contract is worthy of additional consideration given its 
ambiguous nature in some arrangements. 
The special tax relies on the idea that the employee "earns" the 
right to compensation before it is actually paid. The cash-method of 
accounting, however, allows the employee to defer the tax 
consequences of compensation until actual payment. A byproduct of 
this deferral is that current law fails to tax the investment income that 
accrues from the time the compensation is earned until it is paid, and the 
special tax attempts to remedy this failure by imposing an additional tax 
at the time of actual payment. The duration of the contract, which is 
needed to levy the special tax, is the period between the earning and the 
payment of compensation. 
One problem in measuring the duration of the contract arises when 
an employee has not perfected the right to future payment. For 
example, future payment might be contingent upon the employee's 
Fully taxing phantom stock would require bifurcation into these two constituent contracts along 
with applying loss limitations and the like to the forward contract. 
165 0.069 X )0 X 4,000,000 = 2,760,000. 
166 See supra Parts IV.D, V.A. 
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continued service or the employer's profitability. The Code and 
regulations already have rules that measure just this issue under § 83. 
Section 83 taxes the transfer of property when rights to the property are 
"substantially vested," meaning that the property is either transferable 
or not subject to a "substantial risk of forfeiture." 167 A substantial risk 
of forfeiture exists when rights in the property are conditioned upon the 
employee's future performance of substantial services or the employer's 
future profitability .168 Section 83 applies by its terms to transfers of 
property, not to unfunded promises. Nevertheless, the "substantial risk 
of forfeiture" concept can be readily applied to promises to determine 
when they are earned by the employee. 
A more mechanical problem arises when an employee accrues 
benefits under a single plan of deferred compensation over multiple 
years. For example, an employee might defer compensation into a 
single account over several years, much in the same way that employees 
defer compensation into 401 (k) plans. Over the years, the account will 
(hopefully) grow from investment performance and additional deferrals. 
Future payments will have been earned over several years, making the 
measurement of contract duration difficult-yet possible with the 
competent use of a spreadsheet program. 
Measuring contract duration for defined benefit plans, is even more 
difficult, though, as illustrated by the following example: 
Example 14: In 2009, Ray Corp. promises to pay Emily an annual 
annuity upon reaching age sixty-five equal to 2% of her average 
annual compensation multiplied by her years of service. In 2019, 
Emily retires at age sixty with an average annual compensation of 
$1,000,000 and twenty years of service, entitling her to an annuity of 
$400,000 per year, starting at age sixty-five. In 2024, Emily starts 
receiving her benefit of $400,000 per year. 
There is no easy way to know the contract duration in 2019 when 
Emily retires. The special tax was originally designed to apply to 
discrete annual promises. To apply the special tax to defined-benefit 
plans would require the disaggregation of the $200,000 pension into ten 
separate promises. Doing so is theoretically possible if it is possible to 
examine the benefit that Emily has accrued every year, 169 though it 
would require resorting to actuarial assumptions about the value of her 
benefits. 
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as amended in 2005). 
168 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (1978). 
169 For example, suppose Emily has an average compensation of $1,000,000 throughout her 
tenure at Ray Corp. In 2009, with ten years of service, her earned benefit is $200,000 per year at 
age 65 . Every year to follow she earns an additional year of service and an additional $20,000 
benefit. It is possible to view the initial $200,000 and the subsequent $20,000 benefits as discrete 
promises, each having a unique duration. This is a plausible approach, but not a recommended 
one for reasons of administrability. 
HeinOnline -- 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1712 2009-2010
1712 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:5 
However, this Article proposes a simpler solution, which is to treat 
all benefits as having been earned ratably while employed. Thus, when 
Emily retires in 20 19, the duration of her contract is five years-that is, 
half of the ten-year period over which she earned benefits. In 2019, 
Emily has already earned all of her benefits, meaning no special 
convention is necessary in order to handle the additional five-year 
period from 2019 to 2024. Thus, the duration of her contract in 2024 is 
ten years (i.e., the sum of the two five-year periods). Payments made in 
2024 have a duration of ten years, payments in 2025 have a duration of 
eleven years, and so on. 
This assumption of ratable accrual can be extended to all deferred 
compensation earned by a particular employee, at a particular employer. 
Employees will often earn deferred compensation under several 
different arrangements with a single employer. Rather than forcing the 
employer to track the duration of every deferred compensation 
arrangement, this Article proposes that all deferred compensation 
arrangements of a single employee be aggregated. 
Example 15: Emily started working for Ray Corp. in 1989. From her 
promotion to Vice President in 2000 until her retirement in 20 I 0, 
Emily accrues benefits under several deferred compensation plans 
maintained by Ray Corp. In 2020, Ray Corp. pays Emily a total of 
$200,000 under several of its deferred-compensation plans. 
This proposal would treat all plans benefiting Emily as a single 
plan. When Ray Corp. pays Emily in 2020, a contract duration of 
fifteen years is assumed. The clock starts in 2000, when Emily starts 
earning benefits. But since it is assumed that Emily earns benefits 
ratably while employed, the period from 2000 to 2010 results in an 
average contract duration of five years (i.e., one half of the ten-year 
period of accrual). Since no benefits accrue after Emily's retirement, 
the period from 2010 to 2020 adds ten years to the contract duration. 
The total duration of fifteen years can then be used to calculate the 
special tax. If the interest rate is 6.9%, the lump-sum interest is 
$207,000.'7° As before, Ray Corp. pays a special tax on this amount at 
the highest marginal rates for individuals and also deducts this amount 
as an interest expense in 2020. Assuming the same rates as before, the 
net effect is an additional tax liability for Ray Corp. of $31,050 in 
2020.171 
170 15 X 6.9% X $200,000 = $207,000. 
171 $207,000 X (35%- 20%) = $31,050. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conceptually, deferred compensation is composed of 
compensation and investment components. Current law adequately 
taxes the compensation component, but it fails to tax the investment 
component, creating tax-planning opportunities and all the efficiency 
and distributive problems that ensue. 172 The remedy is to tax the 
investment component, achieved by imposing a "special tax" upon 
employers when they pay deferred compensation. 
The special tax proposed in this Article is focused on the taxation 
of the employer. In another article, this Author proposed a modest 
reform for the taxation of the employee under which the employee 
would always pay tax on deferred compensation at the highest marginal 
tax rate, thereby avoiding the problem of deferring compensation from 
high- to low-bracket tax years. These two proposals (the special rate for 
employees and the special tax on employers) would effectively 
neutralize any tax advantage for deferred compensation. 
Negating the tax advantages of deferral has not, however, been the 
goal of past legislation. Section 409 A, as described above, 173 negates 
no advantage of deferral. Instead, § 409A simply narrows the field of 
compensation contracts that can actually achieve deferral. The 
complexity of§ 409A is well known, as is the fact that it fails to achieve 
any discemable tax or non-tax policy. Thus, the additional tax proposed 
in this Article need not be an additional burden on employers who 
maintain deferred compensation plans, as future reforms should 
eliminate not only the tax advantages of deferred compensation, but its 
unnecessary regulation as well. 174 
172 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
174 Future research on deferred compensation will hopefully shed more light on whether low-
tax corporations actually use it to avoid taxation. Getting information about the tax status of 
publicly traded employers is actually feasible. See John Graham, Duke University, Tax Rate 
Order Form, http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-jgraham/taxform.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) 
(providing an order form for simulated tax rates, which are "a sophisticated estimate of the 
corporate marginal tax rate for over 10,000 firms from 1980 through present"). The challenge, 
though, is in obtaining data on the actual usage of deferred compensation. Historically, financial 
accounting required no accounting for the grant of executive stock options beyond footnote 
disclosures and no separate accounting at all for other types of deferred compensation. More 
recently, the SEC has started requiring firms to disclose total pay packages (deferred and current) 
to their top executives. This information is useful and has been analyzed empirically. See 
Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in 
Managerial Compensation (N.Y.U. Working Paper No. CLB-06-003, 2005), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=l291026. The problem with this research, though, is that top executives 
are themselves subject to a different system of taxation than rank-and-file executives. The tax 
code essentially forces public corporations to defer the compensation of top executives in order to 
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APPENDIX: BASIS FOR SPECIAL TAX 
This Appendix will give more rigorous support for the claim that 
the proposed special tax equals the IRS's claim to the interest 
component of deferred compensation. Assume that the employer i~ 
willing to pay the employee Co currently, but instead defers the payment 
for N years and agrees to pay CN instead. Also, assume that fee is the 
employee's marginal tax rate and that fer is the employer's marginal tax 
rate. 
As a preliminary matter, note that interest rate r links current and 
deferred compensation such that CN = C0erN. The rate r is an after-tax 
rate, because it also links the after-tax value of current and deferred 
compensation. 175 From the perspective of the employee, the equivalent 
before-tax interest rate is r I (1 - fee). 
I. How CuRRENT LAw ADEQUATELY TAXEs 
THE COMPENSATION COMPONENT 
This Article bifurcates the deferred compensation contract into 
wage and debt components. Current law adequately taxes the wage 
component. Ideally, the IRS would currently receive a wage component 
of Co(tee - fer). Instead, the IRS receives CN(fee - fer) in period N. 
Because CN = CoerN is simply the future value of Co, the IRS is kept 
whole with respect to the wage component. 
II. HOW THE PROPOSED SPECIAL TAX ADEQUATELY TAXES 
THE DEBT COMPONENT 
To address the current law's failure to tax the debt component of 
deferred compensation, this Article proposed a special tax on the 
payment of deferred compensation. 176 The tax is levied on the product 
of the amount actually paid (CN), the after-tax interest rate implied by 
the parties' deal (r), and the duration of the contract (N). The IRS will 
receive tax at a rate equal to the employee's tax rate (tee), but must also 
grant a deduction to the employer. Thus, according to this Article's 
achieve a deduction. I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2010). What is more relevant to this Article is 
whether corporations use deferred compensation to shelter investment income of employees 
outside the top-paid group. 
175 That is to say, CN(l - t .. ) = Coe'N (1 - t.,). 
176 See supra Part IV.D. 
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proposal, the IRS should receive a net claim equal to c NrN (tee - t er) . 
The special-tax proposal uses continuous compounding. Let r be 
the continuously compounded after-tax interest rate implied by the 
deferred compensation contract. Thus, Cr/r = CN. The equivalent 
debt/compensation combination is constructed much as before. The 
employee receives Co in the current period, pays tax, and loans the after-
tax proceeds to the employer. Thus, the initial loan is Co (1 - tee) and 
be~rs formal interest of r I (1 - tee). As before, the employer pays cash 
interest to the employee to cover her tax bill, but capitalizes the rest. 
The loan, therefore, grows at a rate of r. Thus, at any particular time = 
x, the outstanding loan balance will be Co (I - lee) erx. The amount of 
interest on this loan over a small period of time (dx) is: 
On a net basis, the IRS collects tax of Ctee - fer) on this amount, 
which must be increased to reflect the time-value of money, as the IRS 
is paid only at the end of the loan (time = N). Therefore, the periodic 
tax payments are increased by a factor of e(N-xJr. Thus, the IRS's entire 
claim to the interest on the loan, payable at the end of the loan, will be: 
N fc xr (N-x)r( )d _ 0e re tee - ter X-
0 
N 
JC0eNrr(tee- ter)dx = 
0 
CoeNrr(tee -ter)N = 
CNrN(tee- teJ 
Ill. THE SPECIAL TAX IN PRESENT VALUE TERMS 
Since this Article proposes to levy the special tax upon payment of 
deferred compensation, the tax is expressed in future value terms. Some 
readers might find the present value to be more significant. The 
transformation is simple, as Co is simply the present value of CN. Thus, 
for the continuously compounded model, the present value is: 
It is also possible to conceptualize this amount as the tax advantage 
from deferred compensation under current law. 
Phantom stock gives an employee an unsecured right to payment 
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based on the value of employer stock. In this Appendix, an employer's 
stock is worth S1 at time = j. So, a phantom stock plan payable on a 
single share of stock at time = N would provide a pre-tax payment of SN 
or an after-tax payment of SN(i-tee). 
A critical insight of forward-contract pricing is to equate fixed and 
variable cash flows. From an ex ante perspective (i.e., at time = 0), the 
payoff from stock (SN) is equivalent to the payoff from a debt of S0 that 
grows over time to S0erN. Thus, the after-tax payoff from phantom stock 
is financially equivalent to the after-tax payoff from a fixed deferred 
compensation obligation to pay S0erN at time = N. Because of this 
equivalence, it is possible to simply apply the special tax to phantom 
stock. 
The special tax provides the IRS with a payoff based on the 
amount of the fixed obligation. Here, that payoff would be: 
Again, it is possible to simplify matters by invoking the 
equivalence of fixed and variable payments because the IRS would 
receive an equivalent based on the value of employer stock, or: 
Thus, the IRS is made whole if the special tax is applied to the payoff 
from phantom stock, SN. 
